While some observers commented on the obvious voter fatigue -- at 43.1 percent the lowest turnout since elections to the EP were made public in 1979 -- others issued stern warnings that the new distribution of seats and, hence, shifting influence in the EP, would seriously hamper Turkey's European Union aspirations. While I fully agree with the first observation -- that Europe must analyze why a majority of its voters stayed away from the ballot boxes -- I do disagree with the second assumption. It is against EU political common sense to think that every party on the left is always pro-Turkey while all conservative groups would act permanently anti-Turkey. Think Turkey: a center-right pro-EU government and a very much “maybe one day” supposedly center-left opposition party; a convincing Liberal Party or a successful Turkish Green Party is not yet firmly established.Let me put the EP into context with the EU's other major institutions -- the Council of Ministers and the European Commission. These three key players are complemented by infrequent meetings of the European heads of state and government convening as the European Council, a European Central Bank and, of course, the European Court of Justice. Europeans themselves are confused about which institution is in charge of doing what.
Ankara must learn more about Brussels realpolitik
A key EU body, though not an official institution, is COREPER, the committee of permanent representatives, which is part and parcel of the day-to-day running of the EU and plays a vital role in preparing meetings of the various councils of ministers who come together according to their portfolios -- similar to a national cabinet in all but name. It prepares the agenda for national ministers when they stay in Brussels. While the ministers fly back home at the end of the session, their permanent representatives and staff stay put. Many national observers – Turks included -- underestimate the power of the permanent representatives. As well as being fluent in the English language, they speak French and often Flemish, too; they have friends and family in Brussels; and they go out for a meal or a drink with 27 or more nationalities on a weekly basis. Thus, its staff are experts threefold: for issues that matter to Europe, in Brussels and pressing domestic topics in the 27 EU member states and above all, they have been trained in how to socialize across borders, nationalities and political divides. I wish Turkish decision makers would make much better use of this Brussels micro-cosmos. The route to EU accession goes via Brussels much more so than, for example, via Lisbon, Rome or Helsinki. In case you disagree, you might support my notion that it is still far easier to lobby the Portuguese, Italians and Finnish in one and the same place purely in terms of logistics. Welcome to the Belgian capital.
In order to fully understand the EU's internal workings, we had better start by analyzing COREPER as it gives us the chance to learn about member states' “real” positions away from the fanfare of national or European elections. Its agenda shows the variety and dimension of EU politics and policies, and Turkey's accession is only one item on a very long and detailed agenda. I carefully studied statements from all EU institutions, including references to COREPER, and, frankly speaking, I do not see a seismic shift in future EU policies, neither in general nor in any anti-Turkey terms.
It seems that all will stay more or less the same and as it was before June 7, 2009, when the election results were announced. The EP has to be seen in the context of a complicated co-decision making procedure and not as the sovereign transnational parliament. The EP alone cannot help Turkey or any other candidate country in joining the EU -- it is only one part of a delicate law-making triangle made up of the EP, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. Turkey must make the most of this “realpolitik.”
No seismic shift -- Turkey has many more friends than foes
A press statement by the Conservative Friends of Turkey (CFT) of the UK (cfot.org.uk, June 2009 Newsletter) is a remarkable piece of news in so far as it brings together both the pan-European socialist, as well as the British Conservative viewpoint vis-à-vis Turkey's EU accession. According to the CFT, Jan Marinus Wiersma of the Socialist Group expects obstacles on Turkey's road to the EU due to the gains in the number of seats of the center-right parties in the EP. Ria Oomen-Ruijten of the European People's Party countered by saying that her group was, and is, the dominant force in the EP and, hence, Turkey should not worry at all as the EP voted by a large majority to open accession talks with Turkey.
Sinan Ülgen, EU expert at the Istanbul-based Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), seems to agree with Mr. Wiersma's position that the new EP majority is worrisome for Turkey. Contradicting that statement, Michael Leigh, director-general for enlargement at the European Commission in Brussels, stresses that once Turkey fulfills its reform pledges, the train towards Brussels will remain on track without problems (http://www.foreign-press.org.uk/showarticle.pl?id=836). Diversity and democracy in action!
The next elections for the EP are slated for 2014. Five years from now is a long enough period in politics to increase and improve lobbying efforts on all levels. We have to ascertain that these will most likely be the last five years during which Turkey actually has the chance to lobby for her EU accession. After 2014, I would not expect another 10 or 20 years of keeping Ankara away from Brussels' decision-making corridors makes sense as by then Ankara would simply not tolerate it any longer.
EU membership is no frequent flier program -- either full or no membership
A candidate country should not just swallow all the sweet and bitter pills, which in the case of Turkey, as a candidate country, come disguised in the form of 33 plus two negotiation chapters -- Turkey has to examine which EU it wants to join. A key decision has to be made: Would Ankara prefer a Brussels superstate or not or rather wish to join a more liberal common market? In any case this means full membership and no frequent flyer program -- the type of privileges exchanged for loyalty.
Turkey is an altogether different and more influential candidate country -- think size, emerging economy, political influence, history -- than most of the more recent new member states and should act accordingly.
One more remark: The debate about the concept behind European-ness is back on the agenda, or so it seems. Mistaking record voter abstention rates and comments made by President Nicolas Sarkozy or Chancellor Angela Merkel about why Turkey does not belong in Europe for a general anti-Turkey sentiment all over Europe is wrong. The EP elections reflected on domestic issues; the infamous “We in Europe” slogan as opposed to “We are Europe,” crept back into national campaigning, notably in Germany. Most citizens, when asked about it, would not even know the names of their own EP candidates. They would vote for national parties and issues.
This election was no referendum about Turkey's EU membership. Circles against EU accession both in Turkey and the EU portrayed the results in this light in order to try to have Ankara withdraw its application. Vast majorities in both this country and many EU member states know better. There is no one particular European-ness -- the French are French and the Poles are Polish, albeit cohabiting under the same roof of the European house. Arguments that Turkey is not European are off the mark as perhaps Portugal or Finland is not, either. Who defines European-ness? The people themselves. Would a Spanish traveler proclaim he is European when asked about his origins when visiting the US? Probably not. Why should a Turkish citizen and future “EU citizen” act differently? You catch my drift. Europeans themselves have rather hazy ideas about what constitutes cooperation, harmonization and integration.
Coming back to my initial question of whether Turkey is better off with a Brussels superstate or a fully fledged common market, we detect three options. The first is a loose club of independent states without any visible level of harmonization; the EU would ultimately fall apart and be replaced by another, more viable alternative. The second is a federal Brussels-based superstate where nations have been remolded into “regions where citizens of this certain European region happen to live”; similar to my first observation, the EU and, above all, its people would not continue to support such a move. So what is left? A very viable third way: Turkey must continue its reform process without even blinking at Brussels -- Ankara criteria can easily outperform Copenhagen or even Brussels criteria. Once the time has come around, by 2012-2014 Turkey will be “EU-ready,” and the EU will be welcoming Turkey. Old or new Europe -- Turkey belongs to it and Europe is part of Turkey, too.
