The process of the Ergenekon trial and the freedom of the media. The first could not be discussed without reference to civilian-military relations, although most of the off-the record sessions that I and colleagues from Today's Zaman took part in and other private exchanges revealed that the focus has somewhat shifted from that broad context and narrowed in on the critique about the legal proceedings and what are seen as “wrongdoings” by the prosecutors.
The perception of the Ergenekon trial in Washington is that despite the fact that it tells a horror story of how the fragile democracy here is under threat, the enormously thick content of the indictments cause confusion rather than bringing clarity. Thus, the label “murky” is widely used in the analysis. Questions are also asked on the long detainment times and wiretappings and whether they are necessary. Some raised concern that it will backfire in, for example, the European Court of Human Rights.
Some others underlined the urgent need for a reliable “summary” of what this “swollen” case really is about and what its content truly means. This is a fine point. Attention should be paid, by impartial and credible think tanks or other human rights observers and law experts here, that a “handbook” on Ergenekon be issued and constantly updated. (The European Stability Initiative did a reader-friendly analysis, titled “Turkey's Dark Side,” last year, obtainable through its Web site, but it lacks what has happened since then.)
I offered the following opinion to the people I met in Washington on this matter:
The Ergenekon trial is, without the slightest doubt, a landmark case that might expose all the banditry, hatred of democracy, plots to overthrow elected governments and provocation to stir up armed public unrest. Furthermore, it might be a channel to reveal, once and for all, all the domestic crimes against humanity in dirty wars and terror, single assassinations, extrajudicial killings of some 15,000 people and violent campaigns against non-Muslim minorities, Kurds and dissidents from various camps.
But, I agreed, I told them, that the conduct of the case has been marked with occasional, serious flaws. First, the indictments, particularly the first one, are too thick and lack a compact, understandable summary in their beginning. The additional indictment is a better and more “to the point” text, but still lacks a summary. Secondly, the methods of some of the arrests and raids can be justifiably criticized. Thirdly, the prosecutors' office should be transparent and meet with the press regularly to oust speculation and to clarify where the case is going. This has not been done so far; the case is perceived as being handled in its own mystique.
But, I continued, I had difficulty in understanding the critique of the length of time people are held in detainment until they are put on trial. It must be clear to Americans that Ergenekon is a mafia trial: it deals with charges against a political mafia. In many mafia cases in the United States, special rules on lengthy detainment times and secret witnesses were validated.
In Europe, many cases, such as drug network trials, mean that suspects have to wait over many months before facing a judge. And, I urged them to remember the Christer Pettersson case. He was accused of murdering Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme. The man was kept under arrest for three years before being put on trial.
Both in the U.S. and in Europe, wiretappings in “difficult” network cases were widely and successfully used. Therefore, the focus of the critique on these two parts are based on clichés and myths and often lead to distraction from what the essence and significance this trial is.
That said, it is important to stress the point that Washington, D.C., is not shrugging off the Ergenekon case, except for very few in some think tanks (and the latter stems from political militancy rather than objective positioning.) It is a commendable sign of engagement. Because, although much depends on how successfully and convincingly the prosecution will argue its case, any outcome will be strictly tied to the future of civilian-military relations, of a “clean” state and the reliable rule of law. These should be the main criteria for the Obama administration if it envisages a lasting, consistent “model partnership.”
The discussion on freedom of the media in Washington, D.C., is in my next article.
