These words, coming wrapped in a rather alarming tone from a highly placed Turkish diplomatic source in Washington, D.C., could come as a surprise to any observer of Turkish-US relations. It explains, too, all the zigzags, twists and disappointments, along with positive developments, over the past 15 or so years. Who is to blame? How can relations be better? How to create a milieu of constant trust and build mechanisms that prevent threats which disrupt an increasingly important cooperation? Is it possible while a partner is struggling internally to consolidate democracy, trying to ensure that the rights and freedoms of its citizens are fully protected and civilian-military relations are normalized, or not?
In a lengthy visit, I tried to find answers to those questions -- and many others -- in the US capital. We were a group of columnists from this newspaper, rather happy to be hosted by key people in various power centers there -- the State Department, the Pentagon, Congress -- and various think tanks and institutions. It was, needless to say, timely: In the wake of President Obama's visits to Ankara and Cairo, and also given the busy schedule of Turkish foreign policy and the turbulence in Turkish politics, issues were many and fully engaging in each meeting we had.
The initial phases of the Obama administration's policies on Turkey are based on a delicate balance between the promotion of democracy and meeting the needs of realpolitik. The anxiety marked amongst the American sources, many of whom have experienced Turkey's reality in the past -- since the military coup of 1980 through yesterday -- stemmed simply from the uncertainties on which issue to assign the priority, to give an upper hand to before the others.
In transitional democracies, the balancing act can be problematic. Forces and circles skeptical of democracy, fearful of losing their privileges, may work cunningly hard to turn that balance in favor of realpolitik. In the case of Turkey, a spectacular case now of painful transition towards full-fledged civilian rule, open society and the rule of law, this will turn into a real test of successful foreign policy for Obama and his team.
At the moment, the focus of American officials and observers is on two major areas: Turkish foreign policy and the reform process (“democratization”).
On the foreign policy front, the developing narrative is slightly alarming. Ankara's “quick” act of congratulating Ahmadinejad for the election in Iran -- even before the statement by the grand ayatollah on the results -- has been noted with dismay. Sources made it clear that this put Turkey outside the context of democracies, and particularly out of sync with the EU, which it is striving to join. A second, “developing” narrative stems from what is described as the disappointment of “slowed down” rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia. The parallel comments were that Washington felt “cheated” on this issue, though American and Turkish officials assured us that the process was still on the right track and an achievement is not far away.
But, on the other hand, Turkey's pursued foreign policy -- proactive and multi-layered -- is welcomed by the Americans. “Gee, I haven't heard anyone here complaining that Turks are too active in foreign policy!” joked one American source. On the regional level, Turkey is widely regarded as a constructive partner whose “soft power” approach in the Middle East and Iraq has been praised. So, too, in the coordinated engagement in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Afpak) context.
The reform process and the thorny issue of democratization in Turkey are also part of foreign policy assessments. The expectations are high in the US capital over an “accelerated pace of political reform” and the “irreversible revival of the EU accession process.” But there is a clear division among the sources we met: Some thought Obama's interventions in that process (particularly with French President Sarkozy) should be kept up, while others believed that it had backfired and therefore should be much more subtly orchestrated. Also, efforts in Cyprus talks were commended.
No source disputes the fact that a stable democracy in Turkey increases its political predictability and “soft power.” This was a theme revisited over and over during our visits in Washington. Most of them left the ball to the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). Why, it was asked, doesn't a party which still has a majority in Parliament get its act together and pass laws, instead of letting precious time pass by? The argument that “the AK Party has been staunchly obstructed by the establishment and external forces” does not echo at all amongst Americans in the ever-busy US capital. I will continue to write more on this subject.
