Obviously, one reason for why things proceed to such a point is that those who hold the power are not willing to give up their privileges. Moreover, these power holders can manage to mobilize supporters thanks to their police "disseminating fear." One aspect of this policy is the undesirability of the environment of weakness or chaos that these power holders claim will emerge if they lose control. However, another aspect that is as important as the former is that society has real fears concerning the power holders. Most of the time, social groups cannot voice this fear. Thus, a schizophrenic relation develops between the establishment and the citizens. Actually, the citizens know what that establishment is and show silent rage toward it. However, the primary discourse in the public sphere is the reverse of this rage and authoritarian powers are systematically praised.In some countries, the power of the establishment is "naked." In some countries, on the other hand, the authoritarian mentality is embodied by the official ideology itself; the resistance by the regime exceeds the capabilities of certain institutions and spreads to the entire system. Backed by an indisputably "sacred" ideology and its symbols, the establishment makes it a legitimate policy tool to make sure that the society becomes stagnant.
Recently, Iran and Turkey have reached the peak of a hidden process of tension that has been in place for a long time. In both countries, there is an ideology that seems indisputable, and there are "naturally" privileged groups who are supported by this ideology. By ensuring that these privileges are secured by law, it is possible to define the protection of the regime as a sacred duty, and those who assume this duty become the "natural" rulers of the country. In Iran is a regime that is based on Islam and the mullahs, who seem to be the owners of the regime. In Turkey is a regime that idolizes Kemalism and the military and judicial bureaucracy, which is the owner of the regime.
Both countries have a legal system that gives a green light to imposing restrictions on rights and freedoms. Both countries are affording protection to the real power by employing a mechanism that keeps the power holders out of this legal system. In both countries, the area of maneuver for the elected people is ideologically restricted, and the power holders have the final say about the really important issues of the country. These similarities produce certain expected results with regard to social change: The tension between the "state" and the society becomes increasingly intricate, and the regime tries not to make concessions. Thus, we end up with an establishment that cannot solve any problem, that is wary of every solution and that attempts to legitimize its repressive regime by calcifying the problems. In this case, change arrives not through dialogue, but through conflict.
In appearance, we can say that Iran has a bigger problem to solve: We may think that they will never be modern as they can never change Islam and that they are doomed to be losers. On the other hand, it may be suggested that Turkey is secular and has an established democratic tradition. But, the truth is possibly quite different... Islam has an extraordinary flexibility that stems from its being a religion. Indeed, in Iran, mullahs are divided into two groups. From what they argue and how their supporters act, we can conclude that they suggest that the heart of the matter is not religion, but freedoms, and Islam can be interpreted so as not to restrict freedoms, and even in a way to promote them. For instance, in this country where women are obliged to wear headscarves, women can interpret this obligation with great latitude.
On the other hand, there is a big deficiency of the regime in Turkey: There are no liberals among those who call themselves Kemalists. Kemalism is not a sphere that allows politics, but it is essentially the core ideology of the authoritarian hegemony. In this case, extending freedoms implies that the official ideology has to finish and, in a sense, the republic is to be re-established. The latest document that is thought to have been prepared by the General Staff and new indications that the judiciary are preparing for a second attempt to close down the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) imply that the privileged owners of Kemalist will go the whole hog.
In Iran, there is the tradition of street skirmishes. They are accustomed to pursue politics in the public sphere, and they resist in order not to accept a regression in their rights. When people die, the resulting bloodshed feeds the anarchic environment. But when these incidents stop, we will possibly see a more liberal regime and more liberal Islamic order.
On the other hand, Turkey does have such a tradition of street demonstrations. People are hesitant to pursue politics in the public sphere. They just want to wait and see. This is because the regime has no alternative. This is because it is not possible to reform the regime. Liberalization will come only after the ideological shell of the regime is irrevocably torn down. It is for this reason that it takes time, and it is for this reason that it needs the European Union.
