In a lengthy conclusion, prosecutors helped produce, as I suspected they would, more questions than answers.Again, it does not make much sense.
Prosecutors, acting on “orders” by the chief of general staff, conducted the investigation, from June 12 until yesterday, on the following points:
Whether it was prepared by Col. Dursun Çiçek or anybody else at the military headquarters, whether it was genuine or fake, whether it was used and whether it was stolen.
They came to the following conclusions:
a) The document was not prepared at General Staff headquarters; b) The signature is determined to belong to Çiçek; c) No original was found; d) There is no reason to continue the inquiry, due to complete lack of supportive evidence; and e) The dossier is to be handed over to civilian prosecutors in Istanbul.
The statement details chronologically what was done to determine a response to the questions; and we understand that Çiçek's office and private home was searched, hard disks and cell phones confiscated and an interrogation conducted. Now, one can begin with a question: If the signature does belong to Çiçek, as the findings suggest clearly in the statement, what was his explanation to the question -- if asked -- where the original is? A signature owner should be able to answer that. He knows.
This critical part is nowhere to be found in the statement. Then, let us go further: If Çiçek lies or does not respond to that question, how on earth can the prosecutors, also making clear to us that the original is nowhere to be found, be sure that the document was not prepared at the General Staff headquarters? Is it not a premature conclusion? Any reader of the statement would be puzzled. Further, if Çiçek has been determined as to have signed the document, should he be allowed to proceed as the head of the unit? Will he be let go? With what consequences?
We are also left in the dark on these points. But, perhaps the most mind-boggling part of the story is that the original is missing. This finding will surely plant a lot of suspicion on it and naturally lead to the feeling of a cover-up. By reaching this conclusion, the prosecutors not only help us to question the efficiency of a mighty institution -- the military -- but also say to the civilian prosecutors: “We did not, or could not, find it. Find it yourselves, if you can!”
This message cannot be read in many ways. Whether intentionally or not, it will keep the public mired in speculation, the media in speculation and feed the polarization even further. You can take it for granted that pro-militarist pundits will take the findings as final instruments to unleash a smear campaign against Taraf, claim that the document may be false, and those who leaked it be found and punished by the civilian prosecutors. The burden from now on will be entirely on the prosecutors in Istanbul, who will feel pressurized and rather helpless. Even if there is reasonable doubt remaining or arising anew, they will be unable to conduct their own investigation within the army headquarters.
Has the original, taking advantage of the bureaucratic delay, been “lost” by whoever it is that prepared it? It is very likely that it may be the case. Those in the media or elsewhere in society, who strongly believe that “something terribly evil is hidden in that document” will feel powerless and will continue to desperately claim that the plot was buried by another plot. Then, there will be further speculation that a “deal is cut” between the government and the military, in order not to “wear out” the reputation of the institution.
So, here we are: A military judiciary injecting further confusion, passing the buck to a helpless civilian prosecution, a high ranking officer free, confident and not looking very accountable and life going on as usual. On the other hand, the buck being passed to the civilian prosecutors means, as in the case of now defunct weekly Nokta, which revealed Adm. Özden Örnek's coup diaries two years ago, that a case of harassment against Taraf should be expected, in terms of raid and prosecution.
One could also argue that the document case has exposed a “blow“ to Başbuğ from within the army, from rogue elements which sought to compromise him into “choosing sides,” but that Başbuğ temporarily diverted, detecting who was behind it. How will this affect Erdoğan? Once more, he is faced with the existential question: What is the role of the elected? Are dual -- or schizophrenic -- power structures, in politics particularly, but also in the judiciary, acceptable in a democracy which claims to raise its standards to the level of the EU?
The case of the lost document not only leaves the entire public puzzled, but also the government in limbo. In such environments, a lost document may cause even an entire government to be “lost,” Erdoğan needs to reflect on that.
