Let's say it right now: Turkey didn't always really want to join in the EU during this entire period. It has become part of several European organizations, sometimes with reservations, thinking that being a member of these organizations is sufficient to be fully integrated into Europe. Even being a part of UEFA or the Eurovision song contest were presented as something to be proud of. Besides, there was a rooted belief that Turkey could become an EU member only if Europeans accept this; as a result, Turkey adopted a wait-and-see policy.Changing conditions on the global and European scale demonstrated that things are not that simple. In the 1990s, Turkey noticed that membership would not happen just by filling in an application form. In the 2000s, Turkey finally launched legal and practical reforms for the sake of “harmonization,” and as these reforms were mainly undertaken by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, people perceived the membership process as this particular government's problem.
The ongoing negotiations with the EU unveiled important resistance on two fronts. The possibility of Turkey's membership incited Europeans for the first time to analyze this membership seriously, taking into account the EU's internal problems and the global financial crisis. At the beginning, some Europeans thought that Turkey would not be able to realize all of the necessary reforms anyway. So Turkey would renounce itself from becoming a member and the EU would get rid of Turkey without enduring the responsibility. However, things have developed differently because Turkey managed to realize a set of reforms, getting closer to the accession goal. This progress has provoked an anti-Turkey stance within the EU, which was openly expressed by Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, and their attitude had an impact on the European Parliament elections.
The second resistance front was within Turkey. On the one hand, those who oppose the democratization reforms have done their best to denigrate them and have accused the government of not protecting Turkey's interests. On the other hand, the government felt it had lost the EU's support and became uncomfortable with the idea of getting nothing at the end despite all the trouble. The double resistance made the Turkish public cease to care about the EU membership process, and the belief that Turkey should focus on becoming a regional power grew stronger. Though Turkey's regional power status is a reality, it also brings the risk of being used as an excuse for it to no longer be willing to join the EU. Because there are many people who think that Turkey is a “power,” it can go on living on her own.
The problem is that Turkey's eventual EU membership is probably the most important variable making Turkey a regional power. About the accession process, it's clear that everyone needs some time, preventing the EU from developing a new “indigestion” crisis and giving the government the opportunity to accelerate reforms. But, of course, the present situation cannot be pursued for another 50 years because the process asks Turkey to adopt the acquis communautaire and for Europeans to put up with Turks. Turkey continues to implement reforms, but the rhythm is continuously slowing down. If the reform movement accelerates, everyone will see better that the EU also has to make its decision on Turkey's membership. Of course, Turkey may choose to reinforce its “regional power” status and may not use this position in the EU's favor. No one should think that Turkey can't renounce EU membership; it can very well take that risk.
