Those who are stuck in the “old world” category may see an Islamic power in Turkey today. But the Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) main quality is not its religiosity, but rather that it is carrying a new identity trying to establish social continuity without excluding cultural diversity. Naturally, the main vein of the culture in question is “being Muslim,” and it is no surprise that this kind of a political movement emerged from within that segment of the society. The main question we need to focus on is what Muslims want and how they view the world. When we handle these kinds of questions, we come across a Turkey that is difficult to understand from a modernist perspective.Certainly the prime minister himself is among the most interesting people to observe to understand this change. When you observe Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's personal life, you may find it difficult to comprehend the ideological twists. Therefore, Erdoğan has a problem of convincing those who have a skeptical approach toward him. But the prime minister is not an extraordinary person for those who work in the Turkish public. Take, for example, the studies conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) on social ideology in the last four years. They reveal that similar processes of change correspond to a widespread sociological phenomenon. Today's Muslims identify themselves as religious, but they unify religiosity with the material world. In fact, they define the worldly from inside. So what is transpiring in reality is secularization under the umbrella of religiosity.
But at this point we come across another question: Why does this group of people identity themselves as religious. Studies show that it is related to trying to protect oneself from the state and also to wanting to benefit from the advantages of being affiliated with a community. In other words, in Turkey religion not only poses a question of how it is going to be associated with the spiritual world, but also how it can exist in the public arena. So the real issue is to create a public area that allows people to be religious and, therefore, integrates the religious identity.
The secular ideology that has dominated the state prevented this from happening. But limiting the public space didn't just target religious people. The same state excluded Kurds, Alevis and non-Muslims with different strategies and made them lesser citizens. As a response, while every group became introverted to protect their communal interests, the society faced a fragmentation of identity. Briefly, different groups were excluded from the definition of society in Turkey. In other words, the society was considered to comprise secular Turks only.
However, the secular groups' dependence on the state prevented them from becoming truly “modern.” The state policies on identity, culture and history, reflecting its authoritarian ideology, were accepted by them.
This dynamism is clearly visible in rural areas. This is not an embarrassing change. On the contrary, it has an objective and self-critiquing outlook on all events, including the events of 1915.
Therefore, the fact that Erdoğan described polices applied to different ethnic identities in the past as fascism is not surprising. Perhaps it was surprising that he actually said it. But there is no doubt that this is a view shared by many. Erdoğan, like the late Turgut Özal, is not afraid of change or pursuing change. But, unlike Özal, he does politics over his representative relationship with society. The change in the new religious groups in Anatolia will inevitably have an impact on Erdoğan. Furthermore, Erdoğan not only accused past policies of being fascist, but he admitted to making similar mistakes, as well, because he knows the voters will reach the same conclusions.
While all this was happening, Turkey's “secular” and “social democratic” opposition spokesperson accused Erdoğan of blaming the country's past and called on him to protect its history. Turkey is really a very educational country. In places where the state has internalized a fascist identity strategy, it is impossible for those close to the state to be either secular or socially democratic. In this case, breaking the shell of fascism is the task of the real secularists.
