It seemed that the first steps toward reconciliation could be accomplished by late 2009, with the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, the establishment of diplomatic relations and the setting up of bilateral commissions to deal with multiple issues, including the historical dimension of relations. This optimism has now been replaced by a heavy dose of gloom and doom. It looks like steps of reconciliation will be delayed for years to come.What went wrong? Things started to unravel when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan backtracked and readjusted the terms of a potential deal by once again indexing Ankara's relations with Armenia to Azerbaijan. During his visit to Baku, Erdoğan argued that “the closure of the Turkish-Armenian border is a result of the Armenian occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and that until the occupation ends, the border gates will remain closed.” Needless to say, such words were against the spirit of the April 22 document.
No doubt, the occupation of some 13.5 percent of Azerbaijani territory by Armenian-backed forces is unacceptable and a violation of international law. The real question, however, is whether Turkey's decision to close its border with Armenia has been effective in terms of putting pressure on Armenia. Here, the answer is a clear “no.” Since 1993, Turkey has maintained a policy of keeping its border with Armenia closed until Armenian forces withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh.
This closed-border policy not only had zero impact on Armenia's Nagorno-Karabakh stance but made Armenia less likely to withdraw. In fact, had Turkey maintained its border open to trade and commerce with Armenia, it probably would have exerted more economic leverage over Yerevan during the last 15 years. Instead, Turkey had the worst of both worlds: no leverage over Armenia and a considerable loss of political capital in relations with the US and Europe.
Ankara's position vis-à-vis the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has also hurt its chances of regional leadership in the Caucasus. As Ankara's vision of a “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” makes it clear, Turkey wants to cooperate as equal partners with Russia in the South Caucasus. But currently, Turkey is in the awkward position of blockading one of the countries that should normally have its place in this Caucasus platform. Turkey's leadership in the Caucasus is therefore highly problematic because it is not seen as evenhanded. Finally, Turkey is also interested in supporting the ongoing Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Process to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but it cannot be a neutral broker while it openly supports one of the conflicting sides.
The fact that Turkey is now returning to its traditional positions vis-à-vis Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh strengthens arguments that it only used the promise of normalization in its talks with Armenia to delay US recognition of Armenian claims of genocide. Turkey's about face is likely to generate a serious credibility problem in the eyes of Washington. When the genocide recognition issue comes up again next year in Washington, Ankara will have very few people willing to listen to its arguments.
To conclude, it is important to recognize in all fairness that progress on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will enhance Turkey's ability to normalize relations with Armenia. But Ankara's change of stance with Armenia and the return to the traditional position of tying everything related to Armenia to a frozen conflict is clearly counterproductive. Ankara should realize that the best chance of bringing a new positive momentum to the Minsk process is precisely by engaging more directly with Yerevan. If Turkey backtracks from normalization with Armenia, it will remain on the sidelines for many years to come in the South Caucasus, allowing the US, the EU and especially Russia to maintain the lead in its own backyard.
