Such commentary is produced mostly by those in the United States who are close to neocon and Israel lobby circles, and those in the European Union who seem to favor authoritarian secularism in Turkey even more than the Kemalists themselves. For those readers who have been exposed to such (excuse the expression) garbage of commentary about Turkish foreign policy under AKP rule, I highly recommend a recent analysis provided in a briefing paper penned by Igor Torbakov and Hanna Ojanen for the Finnish Institute of International Affairs titled “Looking for a New Strategic Identity: Is Turkey Emerging as an Independent Regional Power?” (May 7, 2009). Let me summarize what Torbakov and Ojanen are essentially saying:
Ankara is currently pursuing an active and independent foreign policy through diplomatic initiatives that offer mediation between conflicting sides, putting forward regional security schemes and seeking to boost trade ties. The spectacular economic development in the Anatolian hinterland, new social actors who are economically dynamic and culturally conservative, and the increasing power of elected officials are among the driving forces behind Turkey's search for a new strategic identity.
Turks are today less inclined to perceive their country exclusively through the Western (European) prism and more confident in their geopolitical status. This has led to a relative weakening of the “Western dimension” and a relative strengthening of the “regional vector” in Ankara's foreign policy. Turkey's foreign policy architect, Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu, and those of a similar perspective, see Turkey as no longer a country peripheral to the EU, NATO or Asia, but a country in the center of Eurasia with geographic and historical ties to the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia, providing it with the option of pursuing a multidimensional foreign policy.
Turkey's growing interest and involvement in the Middle East has less to do with ideology or frustration with Western allies than the following factors: 1) The AKP leaders see themselves as both politically and morally responsible for the region. 2) The region poses the greatest number of threats (including primarily the volatile situation in Iraq, Iran's nuclear program and the unresolved Palestinian problem) to Turkey. 3) Ankara is concerned that events in the country's neighborhood may have a negative impact on domestic stability. It would be wrong to assess the developing ties between Turkey and Russia as the birth of an anti-Western axis between the two, because they are both cooperating and competing not only for the pipelines leading from the Caspian Basin to Europe but also for greater influence over the South Caucasus.
Torbakov and Ojanen conclude their analysis by responding to the question “What should the West make of it all?” They argue that both the US and the EU should get used to the fact that they are likely to deal with “a different kind of geopolitical animal.” Turkey is no longer a “lackluster developing country and a supplicant of the West” but the 17th largest global economy, a member of the G-20 and a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. “Turkey is today more self-assured, assertive and strategically independent than during the whole of its republican history,” while being deeply anchored to notions of indivisible sovereignty and the nation-state.
The West must, therefore, understand that “from now on Turkey will not allow anyone to take it for granted” and “the Turks will continue cooperating with the West, but will seek to engage partners on their own terms.” Turks no longer perceive “the EU as an indispensable institution confirming Turkey's European identity, but as a useful instrument contributing to Turkey's regional and global stature.” The authors emphasize, however, that “Turkey's ultimate strategic interests and those of the West largely coincide,” because both want Turkey's strategic environment to be stable and open for business.
The most important question regarding Turkey, the authors argue, is how the AKP leaders will be able to harmonize increasingly nationalistic public attitudes with close relations with Western partners. They underline, however, that if Turkey wants to be “an influential regional player, it has no other way to go but ‘Europe',” and must continue its EU-inspired reforms. Torbakov and Ojanen conclude their knowledgeable and intelligent analysis with the following observation: “The jury is still out on whether the AKP-ruled Turkey will manage to stay the ‘European course' or whether it may veer from it.”
Turkey has a history of Westernization that dates back to the end of the 18th century. Even the Islamist movement has had to transform itself and adapt to that main orientation, basically because the people in Turkey demand an open and democratic society. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that Turkey will veer from its Westernizing and democratizing orientation. Support and encouragement from the EU, however, is still important for the continuation of reforms. That is, unfortunately, lacking when Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel try their best to exclude Turkey from Europe, and the Greek Cypriot government tries its best to exploit the accession negotiations for its own ends.
