In a two-hour-long nationally televised speech, Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ practically annulled all hopes that Turkey would soon be a country where military-civilian relations are defined as in a normally functioning Western-style democracy. True, the general’s tone was milder than most of his predecessors. In an apparent effort to restore the deteriorating public image of his institution, he presented himself at relative ease, especially with regard to religious and ethnic identity questions, on which the Turkish military brass have often taken a hawkish stand. However, at the core, there was a cry for the continuance of the semi-autonomous and politically interventionist status that Turkish generals have enjoyed since the late Ottoman era, further emboldened by the inception of the republican Kemalist regime in 1923.
Gen. Başbuğ took the stage again last Wednesday in a two-and-a-half-hour press conference. Just the fact that acting military leaders can talk on topics that mostly fall within the civilian administration’s terrain -- partly thanks to many journalists who seem comfortable with this -- presents clear evidence about the shortcomings of Turkish democracy. The question is: Despite ongoing European Union membership talks and 57 years of NATO membership based on so-called “common values” such as democracy and freedom, why do Turkey’s activist generals still feel so free to meddle in politics, not to mention engage in numerous other extremely controversial and legally questionable activities? To what extent have international mechanisms and institutions had a corrective impact on the role of the military in Turkish politics? I believe anyone who wants more freedom in Turkey has the right to ask these questions.
Even though they don’t usually say this publicly, many Turkish generals are known to disapprove of various aspects of the EU reform process. Cosmetic changes have been made --such as reorganizing the National Security Council (MGK) and state security courts in a more civilian way to meet the Copenhagen political criteria minimally. Given the diminishing credibility of the EU in Turkey, it is not that difficult for military leaders to resist reform demands coming from the European front. The dimmer the light at the end of the EU tunnel gets for Turkey, the less soft power Europeans can exert. That leaves NATO as perhaps the only Western platform that might have some leverage on Turkey, and the Turkish military in particular. However, so far other strategic priorities seem to have outweighed democratic concerns when it comes to dealing with Turkey in NATO.
After all, NATO is based on common values. In the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty it is suggested that democracy is essential to NATO. The fundamental role of NATO is proclaimed to safeguard not only the security but also the freedom of its member countries. NATO often prides itself with its dedication to protecting democracy, human rights and the rule of law. However, by this token, given at least three coups and constant indirect interventions since Turkey joined NATO, the country's membership does not seem to have had the desired effect on the Turkish military and Turkey’s democracy. To be fair, if it weren’t for NATO and other Western-led organizations, Turkey would have been far more behind in terms of its democratic credentials. What I’m speaking of here is lost opportunities and their costs in the past and today.
At NATO summits, every other member nation’s highest-ranking military officer sits behind their secretary of defense. The only exception is Turkey, which only sends its deputy chief of general staff, because the military does not think their top commander is subordinate to a civilian Cabinet member. Normally, exceptionalism is not the norm at NATO. There are mechanisms and preconditions at NATO to help new members, coming especially from the former Soviet bloc, reform civilian-military relations so that they can better fit into an alliance of democracies. For example, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program that was set up in 1994 serves as an overarching mechanism that NATO has at its disposal for promoting democracy. Too bad that, being one of the senior members, Turkey gets away with it. It’s an open question whether Turkey would qualify as a NATO member had it applied for membership today.
Western powers are well aware that civilian-military relations in Turkey are not good enough to be a full-fledge member of the transatlantic alliance. European members of NATO occasionally raise these issues, at least in the context of EU negotiations. But the US, the most influential member of NATO, prefers keeping an extremely low profile on this front. This is not only morally problematic, but also strategically shortsighted, because it prolongs the process that would make Turkey more democratic and free and, eventually, a more stable and stronger component of the transatlantic alliance.
The apparent indifference of NATO to the democratic credentials and human rights record of Turkey and its military has always struck me. During the Cold War, NATO did not put Turkey on hold or revoke its membership in the aftermath of military coups. I wonder how NATO would act now in such an instance and if Turkish generals are being plainly told about the consequences (if any) of undermining democracy. A test case is the ongoing investigation and trial against the “Ergenekon” organization. So far there has been no indication that NATO would take issue with the alleged, but well-documented efforts on the part of some acting and retired senior Turkish military officers to set the stage for a hardcore coup only a few years ago -- not to mention the recent discovery of stockpiles of army-type weapons and ammunition buried under the ground in a second-degree military area by the alleged coup-mongers. Gen. Başbuğ has tried to play down the issue. But isn’t this a security breach, to say the least? Furthermore, does NATO monitor surfacing evidence from the Ergenekon investigation indicating that some officers in a member military might actually have been responsible for plots resulting in thousands of torture cases, disappearances and political assassinations, especially in the predominantly Kurdish regions of Turkey? How can those things be reconciled with the “common values” and practices of the Western alliance? Has there been any investigation within NATO about such controversial actions? I’m really curious to hear from NATO.
NATO may not care that much about the “value” aspect of the military alliance, especially when it comes to Turkey. But, as a Turkish citizen, I do. Since I am paying taxes to fund NATO and, if necessary, will be called to participate in its operations as a soldier (thanks to the military draft system in effect), I should have the right to question the effectiveness of its contributions to my own freedoms. When and how can NATO serve as a platform for really modernizing my military, not only technically, but also mentally? How can I be assured that my military leadership, which often sees even peaceful elements in Turkish society from a threat perspective, mainly due to ideological reasons, is not actually using NATO channels to go after or at least mislabel people they don’t like? Since civilian Turkish administrations don’t have much say on what their chief of general staff does with NATO, who is going to correct them if they are making mistakes with threat perceptions and operations? And doesn’t NATO realize that the sustained political role of the military in a nation like Turkey, where civil society and rights movements have been strengthening against all odds, can pave the way for serious social backlash, eventually diminishing the prestige and effectiveness of a crucial military partner and perhaps -- God forbid -- even destabilizing a key ally?
NATO and its Western members must bear in mind that the more Turkish civil society is emboldened, the more pressing these questions will become. It’s high time they at last adopted a comprehensive reform strategy and a principled attitude so that the Turkish military thinks and operates like a military in a regular Western democracy. This might yield some tactical costs in the short run because of possible resistance. But, in due course, it is good for the strategic benefit of the Turkish military, the Turkish nation and all other NATO members.
