The first weirdness was that in a country that was accustomed to waking up in the morning and seeing the military takeover, the coup attempt came nearly at midnight. The second weirdness was the dedicated use of the Internet as a means of communication. This was a bit of a shy and fainthearted move. In the morning, the government stood fully erect against this timid coup attempt, returning the Internet memorandum addressed to itself to the author. Thus, the military coup was unsuccessful. It failed to achieve its end not only for the day. The presidential election was concluded against the wishes of the coup plotters. And the nation re-elected the targeted government to office with 47 percent of the vote, dealing a fatal blow to the coup aspirants.
April 27 is the moment when the course of history changed. The answer to the following question may give us an idea about this historic change: What would have happened if the memorandum of April 27 had achieved its ends? Or, what would become of the Ergenekon organization, which is today displayed like a circus monkey? Let us rephrase it in a shorter version. Could the Ergenekon investigation be launched if the military coup had been successful two years ago?
E-memorandum of April 27
The e-memorandum of April 27 had been written in the form and style of the memorandum of March 12, 1971. Its ending passages targeted the government -- though more skittishly -- and demanded political changes. After listing the "cases of reactionaryism," each of which would be the subject matter of complaints to prosecutors, it openly interfered with the presidential election and threatened the government as a sanction. With respect to the presidential elections, the army would openly and clearly show "its position and attitude when necessary" with respect to its threats, it was "preserving its unshakable determination" and had "absolute belief with loyalty to this determination." Simultaneously, the Constitutional Court was hearing a case that would determine the outcome of the presidential elections. In other words, with this e-memorandum, the military interfered with the judiciary from its highest rank. The language of the e-memorandum was bad; its phrases were so careless that one would ask, "Where are those good old memorandums?" Its author sought shelter in the darkness of uncertainty and left an escape route by using hesitant wording. We still do not know what "loyalty and belief in determination" means amid those ambiguous words.
Unlike the hesitation and ambiguity in the memorandum, the government used open and clear words to reject the memorandum as would have been done in a typical, democratic Western country. On April 28, the Cabinet convened and following the meeting, the government spokesperson took the floor. He warned that the chief of the general staff was overstepping his limits, saying that he was "responsible to the prime minister." He disclosed that the purpose of the memorandum was to interfere with the presidential elections and to influence the judiciary. "The primary duty belongs to the government in protecting the fundamental values of the state," he said, boldly chiding any attempt to meddle with politics through debates on the regime.
What happened then? The General Staff was mute as if nothing had happened. Everyone got the impression that there was no connection between this e-memorandum and the General Staff. Some even speculated that the memorandum had been posted on the Web site by hackers within the army without the knowledge of the chief of general staff.
Lesson on secularism
The silence of the General Staff also included its failure to follow up the accusations it made in the memorandum. The army had portrayed a picture of threats based on concrete events that it considered as anti-secular. The annual festivities of "Holy Birth Week," held in the second half of April to commemorate the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, were among the "anti-secular" incidents noted by the memorandum. One of the incidents used as a justification for intervening with the government via the presidential election was proved to be true. Yet, this showed another thing. As the text of this memorandum concretely implied, secularism was being used as a very blatant vehicle for its interventions with politics. The reasoning would go as follows: "Threats against secularism have emerged around the country. These threats are calling for the army to protect and secure the regime. We are fulfilling this duty by deciding who will become president, influencing the case currently being heard at the court and eventually forcing the government to resign." The e-memorandum of April 27 should be remembered as the best example of this reasoning, which does not pay heed to the comprehension level of the Turkish nation.
Since the current prime minister wasn't like the prime minister of March 12, who had resigned by leaving his hat back, i.e., the army's threat was foiled, this reasoning collapsed. The only concrete success of the e-memorandum of April 27 was that the Constitutional Court complied with its orders and ruled that 186 is bigger than 367 for the quorum. This was distorted mathematics, and like all distortions, it was rejected by the voters in the elections held on July 22, 2007. The nation rectified the error its army and its top judiciary had made. Turkey just had to spend part of its very precious time to settle an unnecessary problem.
The fiasco of the April 27 e-memorandum showed itself again in another statement from the chief of general staff issued on June 8, 2007. This statement used the second vehicle that the armed forces employ to interfere with politics. When the excuse of anti-secularism could not be used, the army resorted to the excuse of terrorism. Indeed, the seven-article statement, in which every sentence contained multiple grammar errors, focused on the debate about terrorist attacks. "The Turkish Armed Forces [TSK] expect the lofty Turkish nation to show the reflex of showing massive resistance," its final article read. Later, the chief of general staff had to clarify that this "reflex of showing massive resistance" is restricted to democratic reactions. Why should a great army publish a text that it would have to correct afterwards?
Turning point of history
Let us reiterate our question. What would have happened if the government had surrendered to this e-memorandum full of shady phrases? For instance, what would have happened if the government had withdrawn its presidential nominee and if a government of technocrats had been established -- as was done after the March 12 memorandum -- and if the headquarters of the General Staff had functioned as a de facto government and if a shadow as dark as the one caused by that memorandum had been cast on democracy for an extended time?
As three years have passed, we can give some clear answers to these questions. If the government had not stood erect and taught a constitutional lesson to the TSK, Turkey would not have had many things it currently has. It would have lost credit and interests in the international arena. Instead of being a major player in the Middle East, our country would be disreputable, one that has to give concessions in its foreign policy as a trade off for its domestic defects of democracy and one that lacks a strong political will, as was the case in the aftermath of the May 27, 1971, and September 12, 1980, coups. Its economy would have been much more fragile when the current global crisis hit. Domestically, it would be a country dominated by the uncertainty of the text of the memorandum, where everyone would draw different meaning from the same thing and be guided by chaos and insecurity.
Most importantly, the Ergenekon network would never have been uncovered. At a time when the military was busy manipulating politics, the image of the army as unable to keep a record of its weapons would create uneasiness for commanders. Can this be? The military was ruling the country and some spots are excavated and weapons that are under the responsibility of the army are being disclosed. Being aware of the uneasiness of the commanders, the members of the Ergenekon network would contract new violent attacks to add legitimacy to the military guardianship and secure new protection. In short, in the spring of 2007, our dreams for living in a country governed by the rule of law would have been indefinitely postponed.
The foregoing outcomes are not mere speculation. Two concrete phrases in the text of the memorandum are proof of the extent of the dangers we were exposed to. First, with its broken Turkish, the memorandum declares "everyone" that raises objections to the mentality of "How happy is the one who says I am a Turk" as an "enemy of the Turkish Republic," and punishes them by "destining them to remain as they are." Doesn't the current chief of general staff's "people of Turkey" initiative imply that it is not possible to keep Turkey united with this mindset, which is prone to the creation of enemies?
The second phase is directly related to the Ergenekon trial. Doesn't the April 27 memorandum list the murder of the missionaries in Malatya as examples of the threats against secularism and isn't this incident today being examined as part of the Ergenekon investigation?
It follows that on April 27, Turkey saw a threat not only against its democracy. By resisting this threat and saving Turkey from a big disaster, the government also saved the TSK from making a big blunder. The incident of the e-memorandum of April 27 must be remembered as a unique lesson showing us who should wield the reason and insight for ruling the country and the state. The reason we need is given by democracy. This reason is capable of correcting even the faltering of the organizations with the weaponry.
