Undoubtedly, though, the root of the problem actually lies in this unparalleled status. In fact, in no other country in the world would a speech by a military's top commander have the power to awaken such "unparalleled" interest. Do we not have the right to want everything to be normal? Anyway, this speech by the top military commander contained a wealth of signals regarding "normalization," which is why the speech demands some attention from us. With news of the 12th wave of Ergenekon arrests occupying the front stage in the media these days, anything said by the head of the military is, of course, going to be considered important. After all, we are watching as people who wear the uniforms of military officers are being tried on allegations of carrying out mass murders. The ground is being dug up, and human bones are being exhumed. The allegations that are being heard in public are about how. not too long ago, many people living on this soil were "eliminated" in the name of the state, by weapons belonging to the state. And seeing as though it is justice alone that keeps a state alive and on its feet, the head of the military's General Staff must, of course, speak in the name of the institution he leads.
The general's speech was really very long. He found an opportunity to give a clear and organized presentation of his thoughts and priorities. As for the topics he did not touch on, he noted that he would be saving them for the press conference he will be holding in the upcoming week, which means, in turn, that our debates are to continue. For those who are having troubles opining on a speech this long, we need to present an analysis. In short, what did the head of the military's General Staff really say? Well, Gen. İlker Başbuğ did defend the much-debated Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) in a moderate and mature style. His insistent stress on both democracy and justice in his speech were to show that the TSK has not entered into "comrades in arms" solidarity with the people being tried in the Ergenekon case. While he used a very careful tone in dealing with the dynamics of Turkish public reaction, he drew a strong red line in the sand when it came to lawlessness. One by one, he eliminated the trump cards held by those who always defend severe policies by citing the TSK. In this sense then, the words "the people of Turkey" in his speech were of a revolutionary nature. His decision to underscore "integration," rather than "assimilation," was also a choice of language that showed he was embracing universal law and a universal perspective. Even in his stress on the by-now-traditional concept of "secular sensitivities," there was a certain delicacy that is not customary in such speeches. Such was the care he took right up to the point in his speech where he placed Turkey's religious sects squarely in opposition to the TSK. And so perhaps this is the portion of the speech that requires the most consideration.
In order to make clear some of the contents of Başbuğ's speech, we must also focus on a subject that, for all intents and purposes, normally remains in the background. Generally speaking, speeches given on this level and on these sorts of topics do not come directly from the pen of the head of the General Staff, whoever he may be. A group composed of general staff officers and project officers wrestles with the general parameters and subtitles of the speech to be written. For example, they approach it with the idea of "the speech shouldn't be too tough" or that there should be specific stress put on "democracy and justice." In this most recent speech it was clear that the order had been given that the speech "not be combative but with a tone of compromise to it." It is also quite clear that Başbuğ has taken a personal and specific look at the ethnic problems facing Turkey, which ultimately means that the Turkish military is showing its will to move forward into the future in accordance with the era we live in -- with democracy and justice.
In fact, the analyses offered by Başbuğ are an abbreviation of the standards expected from the military of a democratic country, as is the importance he professes to attach to trusting civilian authority. The most democratic statement we can make about the Turkish military is that it is financed by taxes from the people. After all, the magic word that manages to reign in and restrain a military that tends to see itself as superior to the people and as a "political guardian" for the nation is "taxes." The phrase uttered by Başbuğ in his speech about how the "TSK exists to serve the people" should be hung above the entrance to military barracks as a standard motto. In fact, the real value of these words is highlighted when, looking back at recent Turkish history, we see that it has been the opposite belief that reigned in Turkey -- just as during the Feb. 28, 1997 postmodern coup period people were expected to "show their faithfulness" to the military.
The fact that Başbuğ felt it necessary to emphasize that the military is not opposed to religion per se must also be accepted as a new start of sorts. After all, the various manifestations of "secular sensitivity" in Turkey risked turning into direct hostility toward religion. What's more, this meant a deepening in religion-based polarization between the society, on one side, and the various institutions of the state, on the other. As he spoke about how the military is not opposed to religion, Başbuğ was also emphasizing this: "The military is the Turkish people." This type of formulated "religiosity," recognizing and professing respect for the values of society, is a special criterion. As for the phrase uttered by Başbuğ (after he spent time focusing on both professionalism and taxes), "No matter what anyone says, the Turkish people's military is an army of the people, by the people and for the people," this should be read as an acknowledgment of patriotism. But this description of the Turkish military -- which takes its inspiration from the American federalists' description of their new democracy -- is somewhat problematic, because we could in fact derive from this description of the military the idea that it is some kind of representative of the people. In any case, both before and after this point in his speech, it is clear that Başbuğ is painting the picture of an army "at the command of the people."
In terms of İlker Başbuğ's comments on the "Kurdish problem," these deserve their own separate analysis. His speech included many carefully described new initiatives and suggestions on this front. The decision to use the phrase "the people of Turkey" rather than the ethnically slanted word "Turks" is quite on target in this respect. This choice also reflects the definition of citizenship as described in our Constitution, thus putting everything into a stronger and more appropriate legal parameter, as well. In the same way, then, the proposed thesis that in fact Turkey is not engulfed in any ethnic clash or struggle right now is an appropriate and correct diagnosis of the situation. This thesis also requires none of the long analyses and attempts at classifications and sorting of the past. The reasoning is simple: Ethnic-based hostility and clashes among the people of Turkey has never taken place.
Sects and the law
We need the clarity provided by the laws and the justice system in order to distance Turkey from unnecessary and exhausting arguments. Başbuğ had in the past complained about religious sects in Turkey, noting the link between these sects and the weakening of the "social state." There is, however, no answer to the question "What is the position of this complaint with regard to the law?" The fact is, just as with the disputes and confusion that the arguments over secularism have opened the way to in the past, the "military opposition" to religious sects in Turkey needs to be based on a more stable legal basis.
It is a world-wide phenomenon: societies organize themselves within their own ranks. They form their own solidarity networks. They help each other out when in need. And entering into this kind of solidarity with one another allows civil society to find stronger solutions to problems. What winds up happening naturally then is that society enters into a kind of feverish effort to carry its own people and nation to a higher position within the world. But what happens when you declare to your nation that these civilian organizations within society -- organizations the likes of which exist all over the whole world -- are "religious sects" and, thus, the enemy? How is society to respond to this? What Başbuğ and, in fact, the entire military need to understand is that the "social state" as a phenomenon is not the answer to these kinds of social problem-solving mechanisms that they refer to as sects. The real result of the replacement of these organizations would, in fact, not be a "social state" as such, but instead a "socialist state" that would try to shoulder all of the duties of the civil society.
In fact, every society has the right to organize itself as it sees fit in the pursuit of solutions to its problems. A democracy where this right doesn't exist is unimaginable. What's more, the use of religious motifs and calling on "religious emotions" in the effort to support more effective and dependable types of societal organizations is as normal as "freedom of religion and conscience" in itself. To wit, more than half of the accredited international organizations included in the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) are, in fact, foundations with religious purposes. So why does religious solidarity make a civil society organization somehow illegal? How can it be anathema to the law when people come together with the aim of helping the more unfortunate amongst them, and when these people happen to be driven (at least partially) by religious beliefs? Must civil organizations be secular? Isn't secularism a characteristic unique to states?
What Turkey at this point really needs is a wide-ranging illumination on the topic of sects. For those ignorant on the matter, a good starting point would be to investigate the actual modernity of the word "cemaat" by looking to the English word "community" and the German word "gemeinschaft." Today's sects are indispensable creations of human needs. In fact, the sects of today are the products of modernity. Actually, the very "nation-state" so focused on by Başbuğ and roundly condemned by so many intellectuals is a kind of sect. Within this framework, Benedict Anderson also labels the peoples of a nation a "sect of the imagination."
Actions cannot be forced out of a society. Society comes up with its own solutions to essential needs. Max Weber talks about how religious sects within capitalistic societies -- especially Protestant sects -- developed with their approaches toward ethics and morality. And what Turkey now needs is some serious sociological research -- perhaps using the rich horizons of thought provided to us by thinkers like Weber -- on the topic of sects. Speaking sociologically, everything that is religious is ultimately social. Society generally describes its needs and fulfills these needs with religious symbols. The very human needs that keep religious sects and communities alive and well are ones that no state institution would be able to meet. And there needs to be a careful and sensitive examination of whether these same sects and communities are capable of maintaining peace and harmony with society at large. Modern research needs to examine the phenomena we have seen on this subject. We need to pay more careful attention to this matter; otherwise, we will see that a military that has declared war on these societal organizations has in fact entered into a war with the people.
It is right to read the speech from the chief of the Turkish military's General Staff as a sign that Turkey has finally entered an era of greater democracy and rule of law. If the leader at the helm of this much-debated institution focuses with more and more intensity on justice and democracy even while some former -- and current -- members of the military are being tried in courts of law, this means Turkey is in good hands. As for the whole "people of Turkey" initiative on the Kurdish problem, this signals the elimination of a few of the barriers blocking the path toward a solution on this front with a single, swift and strong maneuver.
