Mr. Rasmussen will bring heavy baggage to his new job. In 2006 the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), representing 57 Muslim countries, demanded an apology from him for the Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad wearing on his head a bomb in the shape of a turban. When Mr. Rasmussen refused to apologize and opted not to meet with OIC countries' ambassadors in Denmark, Saudi Arabia recalled its ambassador and the OIC issued a severe condemnation. Violent riots against Danish embassies followed across the Islamic world. In Afghanistan, 12 people were killed when an angry mob tried to march on a US military air base.As a result of last weekend's decision, NATO will now be led by a politician that most pious Muslims associate with the cartoon controversy. It is quite unfortunate that such a perception is emerging at a time when NATO is engaged in a crucial mission in the heart of the Islamic world. More importantly, Mr. Rasmussen's selection complicates NATO's own image at a time when the organization needs much better public relations with the Islamic world.
As bad as the problems are on the military side, they may be worse on the economic front. This is a crucial area, as Washington seeks to help Afghan farmers develop alternatives to opium, judicial systems train and deploy competent judges and schools and health-care centers reach the other half of the population not yet served.
With the country ravaged by three decades of war, most Afghan ministries have no more than a few competent professionals to run their operations. Among other challenges, they must deal with some 40 donors, whose efforts are uncoordinated and often amount to a hodgepodge of individually worthy but disconnected efforts.
Afghanistan needs smarter help. A three-person overall command structure should be created for the coalition's work in Afghanistan. Gen. David McKiernan, the top US commander on the ground, should retain his role but devolve some day-to-day responsibilities to a new operational commander coordinating all foreign military activities throughout the country.
In addition, an international aid coordinator, accountable to the NATO secretary-general and all major donors and representing a single major point of contact for the Afghan government, should be named -- somewhat along the Paddy Ashdown model from Bosnia in the 1990s. The current UN coordinator does not have nearly enough control over most funds to play this role.
There is a very natural way to share the burden, and responsibility, of this new command structure. With two-thirds of all foreign forces in Afghanistan soon to be American, not only the commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), but his deputy in charge of day-to-day operations should be a US military officer. But with two-thirds of all economic and development assistance of non-US origin, the aid and development coordinator should be European.
Turkey should have a large role in the new European leadership of NATO or the Afghanistan mission. One mechanism would be for Mr. Rasmussen to nominate a Turk as his top deputy. Hikmet Çetin, a former Turkish foreign minister who served in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2006 as NATO's senior civilian representative, would be the most suitable candidate given his familiarity with NATO, as well as Afghanistan. The selection of Mr. Çetin would also encourage Turkey to contribute more troops to Afghanistan at a time when the organization desperately needs a greater Muslim presence.
This approach would maintain the sense of international partnership of the Afghan mission while keeping leadership jobs in the hands of those making the greatest contributions. It would also be a good way for US President Barack Obama to show what his new style of American global diplomacy will entail -- with recognition of the role of allies and partners, yet a strong and sustained sense of US leadership.
