Certainly, this is clear: given the "external" elements (as tools) used to intervene and divert the civilian politics' natural streams, it would be fair to say that the AK Party's continued rise until the 2007 elections depended upon how large chunks of the voters reacted to those illegitimate "anti-politics" moves, such as "institutional threats," the e-memorandum, the 367 quorum for Parliament to elect the president, the closure case, etc.The "systemic lull," the obvious relief of pressure over the political sphere, matter of factly displayed the limits of how high the AK Party could reach in its popularity and the "red line" of the electorate for crossing over to a worrisome "one-party regime."
By failing to reach a psychologically critical 50 percent barrier, the AK Party case proved -- again, as it is known in normal politics -- a vulnerability and even tiny signs of mortality, which altogether must be taken as a positive sign of Turkish democracy, which has been "adjusted" through the voters' simple method of "checks and balances."
It signals, if allowed by the rogue elements of the "establishment" in Ankara, that various streams of politics will settle further into their own channels and Turkey's rational voters will act even more reasonably when no threat is perceived from those elements.
"Threat perceptions" about the elected government and its party together with the promising reformist approach of the AK Party, until the mismanagement of the process for a new constitution, had solidified an "alliance" of various political leanings around the AK Party until recently. The result shows that as part of the clear deviation from proactive policies of change and because of its new image of "less reformist" and "reluctant" approach the alliance is dissolving. Liberals of the right and left flanks and urban Kurds have (perhaps temporarily) withdrawn their votes and cast elsewhere.
But this explains only part of the enigma. It is certain that the gap between the perceptions of the voters and Erdoğan about the economic crisis proved large, and in many areas, including the predominantly Kurdish provinces, it explains the flow particularly to parties like the Felicity Party (SP).
But, in economically important provinces, such as Sakarya and Kocaeli (center of automotive industry) or Bursa and Denizli (textiles), the AK Party emerged as a winner. It could be argued that the choice of the candidates had an impact, but the loss of provinces such as Manisa and Balıkesir can be explained more by the reactions to the AK Party's Kurdish policies than the bad choices.
Antalya is the most enigmatic one of all. Few observers doubt that the former mayor -- and candidate -- of the AK Party, Menderes Türel, was a lousy performer in duty. Again, few observers believe that the new mayor (of the Republican People's Party [CHP]) will perform any better -- if at all. What made Antalya voters change their minds? Together with concerns about the crisis -- that might hit tourism badly -- one must also argue that the concerns about lifestyle and perception of imposed values by the ruling party had an impact.
Looking back to the national vote shares, roughly 39 percent for the AK Party is somewhat magical. Had it ended above 40 percent, the mood of the AK Party would differ much. Had it gone down to 35 percent, the national debate would be much fiercer. It is as if the voters carefully calculated the dose of "heads up" ingredients that are humbling to the AK Party and its current stand on things.
Disregarding the crisis and unemployment, and the sui generis trend of the Kurdish vote in general, one conclusion would be that voters carefully took the AK Party by the nose and warned about: a) Style of discourse, b) Management.
Erdoğan should know better than anyone that voters here dislike confrontation between political players; they hate to see them endlessly fighting, saying less about the voters' needs than their own overblown egos. This is why the CHP's Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu struck such a positive chord in their hearts. Voters did not agree at all with Erdoğan's rough challenges to his adversaries and to the media and rejected his humiliation of credit holders. They want to see a calmer and more attentive political leader who shows respect not arrogance.
It is obvious the exodus of votes can also explain the dismay felt about political management -- of EU reforms, the Kurdish issue, the perceived indifference to the global crisis and the imposition of local candidates against the spirit of democracy within the AK Party.
Both the results and challenges facing the AK Party, along with the other elements, mean a new page is now being opened in Turkish politics. Erdoğan will need to respond strongly to the voters' warning. Will he take the AK Party more to the center? He knows that he can win some of them back, but not all. He will have a much harder time than before. His choices will define the next decade.
