Before us is an incredibly rich resource that one could not even imagine obtaining otherwise. Now it is up to researchers to scrutinize this material and bring together the bits and pieces to make sense of past events -- just like a puzzle. As I brought bits and pieces of information from different sections of the 1,909-page second indictment in the trial of Ergenekon side by side, a once very controversial event began making sense to me. The event involved President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's opposition to every ambassador suggested by Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Gül. After Secretary-General of the National Security Council (MGK) Yiğit Alpogan was assigned to London as the Turkish ambassador, the government nominated several ambassadors for the vacant civilian secretary-general post. But President Sezer vetoed each nominee, one by one, without providing any justification. Later, there was talk of appointing a military official to the civilian post. Sezer's vetoes of ambassadors were not limited to the post of MGK secretary-general. He also vetoed without any justification the names of five ambassadors who were nominated by Gül for deputy undersecretary posts at the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Everyone was shocked when the president returned a troika decree to appoint Feridun Sinirlioğlu, Ünal Çeviköz, Uğur Doğan, Haydar Berk and Selim Kuneralp to the deputy undersecretary posts.
It was the first time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had encountered a collective presidential veto, causing serious concern for the ministry. In total, Sezer vetoed the names of nine ambassadors. Infuriated by the situation, Gül had lashed out saying, "There are no ambassadors left in this ministry!"
Sezer's refusal to approve appointments to certain posts lest the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) organize its own cadre within the bureaucracy is understandable to a certain extent. But it was truly surprising to see the president issue vetoes to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, known as the strongest government institution after the military for preserving tradition, employing only the most qualified that pass high security clearances and seen as distant from the public.
Looking at the data on page 497 of the second indictment it is no surprise that those events occurred. The data reveal that the Ergenekon terror organization had also kept files on Foreign Affairs Ministry personnel.
On CD number 5, there is an excel file named "Dışişleri 1.xls" under the folder name "İRTBLR" that contains the names of 105 Foreign Ministry workers. Since prosecutors are protecting the names on the list, we do not know if the names Sezer vetoed were there. However, there are important clues on how Ergenekon suspects categorized diplomats.
Some notes that have been written across names are: "in contact, contact must continue, assisting, amorist, could be barred, should be protected, can be trusted, should be assisted, influential in ministry, can be useful, expects promotion, appropriate for further support, has been supported, has been useful, open to collaboration, is not useful, distant, has intelligence collecting abilities, has uncontrolled relations with women, is not supporting us, has bleak future, has no expectations, can be helpful, can be considered in times of need, will not be considered, has important international ties, consider after retirement, should continue to monitor, continues to be helpful, received necessary support for entry, should be protected upon return, timid, has trouble in bilateral relations, people he suggests should be supported, has job security, continue cooperation, appointed successfully, contacted upon recommendation, positive first impression, ambassador should be supported, extreme leftist tendencies could pose problems, appointment to higher position should be supported, ip (possibly Workers' Party) ties can be used, full connection, provided useful information and contact information, has started work in palace, must become ambassador, must obtain an active position, entire family supports Workers' Party. …"
Obviously these records were not kept as a hobby. They were influential both when making contact and appointing officials to certain posts. The picture becomes much clearer when we add to it another section of the indictment that refers to the frequent contacts made between high-level Ergenekon members such as İlhan Selçuk and Mustafa Balbay and President Sezer. According to the indictment, Balbay made a visit that took around 80 minutes to Sezer without scheduling an appointment first. The indictment notes that Sezer told Balbay and Selçuk to inform him any time they were in Ankara and that he would certainly make time to meet with them. Sezer allegedly said, "Let me know if there is anything I can do."
When we place these three different frames side by side, the result is an unfortunate image. That said, it is likely that the indictment contains many more frames that need to be put into perspective.
In the midst of all of this, if I were a diplomat I would be wondering what Ergenekon has written about me.
