One possible attack was averted on Saturday in İstanbul and the recent operations by the police department prove a remarkable efficiency. The attacks by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the large operations of the army have also come, at the least, to an interesting intermission, if not to a terminal point. After the equinox the snow will soon melt, and the risks are as high as the opportunities. Well, quite.
Overall, nationwide it is a promising lull.
No more fear, no more dead soldiers' funerals, no more killing of the young Kurdish militants, no more crying. Who knows, perhaps Turkey is closer to what its citizens dream of -- in terms of peace and quiet.
As a rule in political management, resilience pays. The Ergenekon arrests and all its related revelations spread, one would assume, more than anxiety to the segment of political gangsters, both civilian and in uniform; and the wise, but minor, steps to recognize the cultural aspects of the Kurdish reality -- a wisdom shared by the top command, which is commendable -- opened new gates to tackle all the other aspects of the problem. The statements by the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BİLGESAM) and former officers such as Salim Dervişoğlu have been helpful, admitting the grave mistakes in turning the Kurdish issue into a Gordion knot.
With President Abdullah Gül's visit to Baghdad, beginning today, a brand new chapter is opening. Gül had hinted earlier that we could expect "very many interesting things" in resolving the issue over which much blood has been shed. A little later, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani told my colleague Cengiz Çandar in İstanbul that he was very optimistic that the conference planned for April or May would put an end to the PKK's armed struggle, an end to violence.
The language of weapons serves neither Turks nor Kurds' interests; Talabani's message was that this is no longer an era for guerilla warfare.
Yet, the current picture indicates that convening such a conference will not be that easy. I heard, too, that Talabani, at a dinner in İstanbul, chose to restrain his optimism somewhat. It is the region that causes caution; its people are traditionally rather volatile, inclined to a radical change in mindset.
Suspicions remain and will continue to until the very end.
This is because the main focus of the conference, the PKK, is rather decided on setting out what Iraqi Kurds see as tough conditions since it fears a total alienation from the other Kurdish actors. Although its jailed leader, Abdullah Öcalan, gave a distinct signal by not opposing the idea at all, the PKK and its political wing, the Democratic Society Party (DTP), display extreme caution.
This has to do with many factors -- primarily, the local elections. The challenge by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) vis-à-vis the DTP in the predominantly Kurdish provinces of Turkey is real. The soft approach chosen by the government opened fault lines in the DTP's traditional voter base, confusion entered in, fear of reprisals faded away, albeit slowly; many Kurds lend an ear to arguments and pledges of the AKP's local candidates. In the polls scheduled for March 29, if defeat occurs for the DTP in general, an acceleration of the dissolution of the old-type PKK mindset is to be expected.
This paradoxically increases the chances of the conference's success; a weakened DTP would prefer to be there in order to prevent total division. Victory, on the other hand, could complicate matters, giving the PKK room for maneuver and bargaining with Iraqi Kurds, in particular. In such a case, the argument that "choosing the democratic way, since it pays," will work and eyes will turn in any case to Ankara.
It is inevitable that both sides will have to take steps to stop the violence. And both sides stand at a very critical juncture.
An AKP victory, as expected, would increase the chances for Ankara to take some steps seen as necessary to clarify its intentions. The key issue is an amnesty for PKK members, its timing and scope.
At the same time, an urgent step to expect from the PKK is for it to pave the way for the conference's declaration of a "permanent cease-fire," a symbolic act that will eventually legitimize the PKK before all the other actors as a dialogue partner.
Insisting on the same modus operandi would be costly for the PKK, although it is not clear whether its leading ranks see that: Given the "reset" in the relations between Turkey and the US, the PKK will also be a problem for the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and will have a fight on two fronts.
Will the PKK take its position beyond its limits?
It depends on Ankara. If Ankara continues to use its recently adapted "soft power," it will have to prepare a detailed plan for amnesty, for inclusion of PKK militants in peaceful politics, a plan which would include the PKK's "leaders" being placed in exile -- Norway or Canada. Such a step would already begin the disarming process of the PKK. It will be pressured even more to make a final choice.
Eventually, the terror will not cease completely, but it will diminish to manageable levels.
