Around the time these preparations for inciting a military coup started, there were two issues that could have been potentially used against the newly elected Justice and Development Party (AK Party): The Cyprus issue and the government motion of March 1, which would have allowed US troops to use Turkish territory in their war against Iraq, which, in turn, was directly related to a number of complicated issues such as Iraq, northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and national relations with the US.The most effective way to undermine a ruling party that has assumed office after a decisive defeat of the opposition was to legitimize the accusation that the AK Party was betraying the country in its handling of some key national issues. Indeed, we know how the government's pro-solution stance on the Cyprus issue had upset certain people and that during talks being held in New York for the settlement of the Cyprus issue -- a major barrier to the country's EU membership -- the same people who are now frequently being connected to the coup attempts were planning to issue a statement in order to sabotage the effort and cause the government to slip. We also know how hard President Rauf Denktaş and his adviser Mümtaz Soysal had tried to avoid a solution.
The generals who were talkative about every other issue would keep silent about the government motion for allowing US troops, which was a fundamental national security issue. Indeed, the government was facing a very hard dilemma. The AK Party will either take sides with the US, will consequently be labeled as pro-US and pay the price of the soldiers martyred in Iraq, or if it opposes, then its relations with US will be worsened, which would make things easier for coup supporters. The headline "Young officers are uneasy" had been run in Cumhuriyet on those critical days as part of the same plot described by the author of the coup diaries. No one can deny the fact that the Republican People's Party's (CHP) harsh opposition to the motion was geared toward sowing of the seeds of hate between the US and the AK Party.
Despite its inexperience, the AK Party managed to foil this plot through something unintelligible to the human mind, perhaps because it was very lucky or was protected by divine forces, as some have suggested. Although the government sent the motion to Parliament and the majority of the ruling party members supported it, it was rejected. This not only saved the AK Party from the trap set for it. It also spared Turkey from the risk of being delved into the quagmire of Iraq, and crowned the AK Party with the reputation in the eyes of the Muslim world as being the force that rejected the motion -- against the wishes of the US.
The same thing happened with Cyprus issue. The AK Party supported the Annan plan despite the fact that it contained provisions that might be used against itself. However, in the referendum the plan was accepted by Turks but rejected by the Greeks. This not only eliminated the risks for the AK Party, but also ensured that Turks emerged as the pro-solution party for the first time in history.
Actually, this narration is not foreign to those who closely followed these developments. But, the coup diaries of Balbay reveal in their own words the shadowy mission taken by the pro-coup squad to the national cause, the Cyprus issue. Let us read the dialogue on Cyprus between then Gendarmerie General Commander Şener Eruygur and Balbay:
Ş.E. - OK, guys, you are right, but what will we do? The country is collapsing, I must tell you ... Everything is slipping away ... What will we do? Will we all just sit and watch this decline? No, no, this is not acceptable.
M.B. - You are right about your point. We, too, are writing about it ... For instance, Cyprus; we have already lost it ...
Ş.E. - Yes, we are losing Cyprus ... Many things will follow it; first the Aegean region, then the Southeast will become controversial. ... This is how things will develop. ... On the other hand, there is a potential in Anatolia. This is what I understand from the reactions I got and the picture I see ... We must find a way to activate this potential ...
M.B. - What can be done about Cyprus?
Ş.E. - We are already giving big support to Rauf Denktaş. We should not do injustice to him as he is heroically fighting both against internal forces and external forces. ... For instance, I call him at least twice or three times every month to tell him that he should stand firm.
M.B. - There is something going on in New York ... What should we do at this point.
Ş.E. - Of course, we are monitoring those developments. We must do something depending on the result of the talks. Perhaps, a written statement or a memorandum may be issued or something similar ...
A particular section of this dialogue literally freezes one's blood. This is because it shows that a commander who in theory is supposed to be under the command of the ruling government was ready to use a very complicated foreign policy issue against the ruling government. Eruygur sums up his Cyprus plan as follows: "To make sure that they [the government] are crashed down by the Cyprus issue, and at the same time, Cyprus is not lost. ... A very delicate balance."
Shouldn't we draw a lesson from this dialogue? In another article, I will discuss another foreign policy issue which, like the Cyprus issue, was attempted to be used against the government.
