These people believe the government is following a specific strategy that will give the AK Party an advantage in the elections, which will put divisions caused by the Ergenekon case to the test. Who knows, perhaps they believe columnists such as myself have knowingly or unknowingly become AK Party supporters. But then there is the "concrete analysis of a concrete situation." This phrase was used frequently by leftists at one point and was believed to be the key to scientifically proving a suggested hypothesis. Although the scientific claims of a columnist are limited, analysis of the physical situation is critical. In other words, we need to examine the changing trends of the last 20 years more closely to understand where Turkey's social momentum is taking the country. Analyzing these trends will enable us to decipher the secret meaning of the upcoming elections.
Over the last 20 years, we've witnessed the step-by-step mental secularization of conservatives. While the percentage of people who identify themselves as "religious" has increased, being religious has evolved into something new, adapting to daily life. The effects of this process are still being felt. This new type of mentality has also created a new urban project amid the globalizing world. It has created a self-sufficient Anatolia in İstanbul and Ankara and a peculiar new type of bourgeoisie led by a young, educated and bilingual generation.
These changes were reflected in laic circles as well. The obvious division among laics and conservatives became ambiguous in the urban setting. Families from different parts of Turkey began sending their children to the same schools, vacationing in the same places and buying the same furniture. Thus a new middle class that veiled community divisions emerged.
But an assessment based on field observations and evaluations is not "concrete" enough. We would be better able to understand the changes in Turkey if we had some statistics, and fortunately, we do. Some numbers collected by reporter Erol Katırcıoğlu illustrate the dynamics of Turkey's transformation.
Katırcıoğlu compared data from the years 1985, 1993, 2001 and 2004. The most striking bits of information were the trends of value added among the two types of economic players in Turkey -- powerful "central actors" and smaller "peripheral actors." In 1985, 66.1 percent of total value added in Turkey involved central actors. This share continuously declined, dropping to 49 percent in 2004. The share of value added by peripheral actors increased from 34 percent in 1985 to 51 percent in 2004, surpassing that of central actors for the first time.
The second important indicator Katırcıoğlu discussed was employment for the same years. According to the data, the share of employment provided by central actors dropped from 52 percent to 33 percent; consequently, employment provided by peripheral actors increased from 48 percent to 67 percent, after several years of maintaining a steady trend. The share of employment provided central and peripheral actors was last equal in 1987. Since then employment by peripheral actors has grown to nearly double that of central actors.
He also evaluated industrial consumption of electricity and utilization of bank loans. According to Katırcıoğlu, industrial consumption of electricity has increased more in the central, central eastern and southeastern regions of Anatolia -- which are often labeled underdeveloped -- than in the Aegean, eastern Marmara and Mediterranean regions. The increase in bank loan utilization is even more surprising, as the largest increase in bank loans was found in southeastern Anatolia, Central Anatolia and the western Marmara. In fact, the utilization of bank loans in Central Anatolia is much higher than the national average.
These numbers show that changes in the economy closely parallel changes in mentalities. When we divide economic actors in Turkey into central and peripheral, we see a sharp decline over the last 20 years in the power of central actors to boost the economy, and there is no sign that this trend will be reversed. The AK Party emerged as the result and standard-bearer of this change. Behind the rivalry between the Doğan Group and the AK Party is the hopeless resistance of failed central actors. Laic people among central players are reluctant to support the investigation into the Ergenekon case because eliminating anti-democratic alternatives would enable peripheral actors to establish dominance in politics.
We are headed toward the elections amid this atmosphere. Central actors are hopeless because they are losing the power that was once in their hands. They are incapable of creating a meaningful alternative to the AK Party, and they are ready to raise the white flag in the economy as well. Meanwhile, the periphery is hopeful the new elections will lead to a new period of prosperity for them. So all this leads us to the brink of a referendum. The results will not be a surprise. We will witness 20 years of social momentum win renewed legitimacy through a democratic mechanism.
