He meant, of course, the "G-word" issue: whether or not the US Congress will move ahead to pass the shelved resolution and recognize the great Armenian tragedy as "genocide," and whether or not President Barack Obama will employ the word in his speech for the anniversary of April 24, 1915, seen as a symbolic date marking the beginning of the controversial events.His remark is following in the tradition of Turkish politicians, who love to base their rhetoric on fear-mongering; it is a dearly kept heritage whose core can be traced back to the days of the birth of a republic out of many a difficulty. Anxiety is the name of the game when faced with new challenges.
A simple analysis of Babacan's "risk in April" warning is that Washington is learning in favor of using the "G-word." He was, to be fair, relatively cautious in his comment in comparison to the bolder style of his predecessors of the 90's. Babacan explained: "We are not using the threatening rhetoric. We are not saying 'if you pass the resolution, we will do this and that.' Honestly, we are telling them about the current situation in the southeastern Caucasus. A resolution between Turkey and Armenia has never been that close. Where we stand now is the closest point ever to a settlement with Armenia since 1915. I'm not saying we've reached a solution, but we are getting close to it." When asked what he meant by a "solution," he defined it as "full normalization."
Fine. After all, the prime minister describes a healthy momentum, ripe with opportunity; indeed both sides are proceeding toward a positive conclusion. As Grenville Byford wrote in Newsweek:
"Progress has been possible because the Armenians have focused on the concrete issue of opening the Armenian-Turkish border -- a vital matter to them since none of their other neighbors (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Iran) can offer a viable trade route to the West. Both sides have wisely avoided the genocide dispute, surely recognizing it will have to be dealt with eventually but that developing economic ties will make it easier to do so. …To those aiming for reconciliation, two questions outrank it: what common facts can Turks and Armenians be brought to accept, and is the common ground sufficient for both sides to start binding up the wounds? To this end, Erdogan's proposal to establish a joint historical commission should be pursued. Though Armenia has rejected the idea so far --largely because it is winning its argument on the world stage --the government has softened its stance recently. If the aim is reconciliation, persuading the Turks to abandon the blanket denial they are taught as schoolchildren is what counts."
Sources reveal that the element of a "joint historical commission" has now become the make-or-break issue in the talks. But we are closer to the "make" side of things because the dispute seems to focus on technicalities of a commission's operations (timing and structuring, etc.) rather than the possibility of its existence. Once an agreement is reached on these matters, the path will be much clearer to establishing diplomatic relations and opening the land border.
Why then is Babacan keen on drawing attention to possible "risk"? What is the "risk"? If we dissect the meaning of his statement, we would see a clear warning to Americans, if not a threat. He is saying: While we continue to talk to Yerevan, any third party move to intervene by "imposing the recognition" will backfire. Erdoğan and his government will face an enormous pressure from political adversaries and "the establishment" and might even be forced to put an end to the process -- so don't rock the boat.
This process is serving as a hostage to achieve various political goals, as made apparent in Babacan's remarks. Yereven, too, takes part in the calculations and negotiations for ransom. As the critical April date approaches, Turkey could be in favor of a "delaying" a move in favor of a rapprochement after making sure that Americans refrain from a "G-word intervention." In this sense, negotiations are inevitably turned into leverage for pressure. Yerevan faces a dilemma too: Though the mood in Washington is more than ever in favor of recognition, Obama's decline to use the "G-word" in April might have various political and economic consequences at home. For the Americans, on the other hand, the sooner a deal, the better. Probably because there is already a strong international consensus that it was in fact a "genocide," and nothing will make this history go away; it will always be there.
In all simplicity, a normalization between Turkey and Armenia is good for all parties involved, including for the interests of the US and even Russia. Therefore, the dream scenario would be: Babacan and Nalbandian reach a deal and declare jointly in the Alliance of Civilizations Forum, to be held April 6-7 in İstanbul, that a fresh start will take place between the two countries with new challenges and opportunities. It would send the entire world a well-needed signal that risks are overcome only by encounters in peace and talks. It can be done.
