The debates caused by this radical change in policy are triggering conflicts within the organization. On the other hand, a Kurdish national congress led by Massoud Barzani is in the making. It is very unlikely that this congress, which will be attended by Kurdish political groups from Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, will start a pan-Kurdish political movement. The Turkish government and state officials, too, are seeing radical changes in their perception of the issue. In Turkey, the term "government" refers to the ruling political party and the civilian bureaucrats that act as instructed by that party, while the "state" represents the military and, to some extent, diplomats. The change in the government's policies toward the Kurdish issue is sufficiently salient. The question is whether there is really such a change in the state policies.State policies
A report submitted by the Middle East and Balkan Studies Foundation's (OBİV) Foreign Politics and Defense Group (DSA) to the National Security Council (MGK) is proof that the "Kurdish issue" has entered a new phase even for the Turkish state. The two-page report contains the following remarks: "Turkey must be able to settle the Kurdish issue 'from within.' ... The perspective that views the issue only as a public order problem should be immediately abandoned and, instead, a package of economic, social and culture measures that are designed to resolve various aspects of the issue should be drafted and implemented with a political vision." What makes these sentences meaningful is the composition of the group that prepared the report. This report has been prepared by a group that includes numerous high-profile retired civilian and military bureaucrats who have long tended to view the issue only as a security problem. İlter Türkmen, a doyen of diplomacy, and hawkish retired Air Forces commander Gen. Aytaç Yalman are examples of these figures.
The short and concise report is largely quoted without citing any references from the previously published report by the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETAV), titled "The Kurdish Issue: Problems and Proposed Solutions." SETAV's report summarizes a perspective that is also largely adopted by the government. Since the DSA's report does not advocate an academic opinion, but suggests a policy, this convergence implies that the "military solution" thesis is being replaced with a civilian solution.
The fact that the military vision that views the "Kurdish issue" as a terror issue and argues that it should be settled with military measures is being substituted by a new approach that suggests that the issue should be treated "with a political vision" does not represent a change at the state level only. It also hints at that the emergence on the opposite side of an approach that prefers "political vision" over violent conflict. This picture is indicative of the possibility that the dissolution of the PKK and the resulting end to terrorism could give way to these suggested options via politics alone.
When Ahmet Türk from the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) spoke in Kurdish during a meeting of the party's parliamentary group on Tuesday, this served as a good opportunity for testing the level of preparedness amongst state and government officials for this new policy. The test showed the failure of the government officials.
Civil disobedience
The civil disobedience thesis first developed by US writer and transcendentalist philosopher Henry David Thoreau had given Gandhi great political leverage. Türk's speech in Kurdish basically relies on this form of political action. Türk his action was just like those of other civil disobedience activists, aiming to show "the meaninglessness and unfairness of bans."
Civil disobedience is a non-violent form of revolt against authority. These non-violent acts are intended to show the general public the unfairness of laws and the injustice of the authority. If necessary, laws are violated so as to ensure massive detentions. In this case, the state will either have to implement the bans that are being targeted or abolish them. When Gandhi started to sell books banned by the British administration, going from one village to another, the British administration had to abolish the ban on those books. There are two methods by which one refuses to surrender to authority: violence or disobedience. One is a military method, and the other is a civilian one.
The proof of the "meaninglessness and unfairness" that Türk attempted to show with his civil disobedience is the relevant article of the Political Parties Law, which was cited by the Parliament Speaker's Office as a justification for stopping the live broadcast of Türk's speech. The Parliament Speaker's Office referred to Article 81 of this law, which reads: "Political parties shall not use any language other than the Turkish language in drafting or publishing their bylaws or programs, in holding their party congresses, indoor or outdoor meetings or rallies or in making their publications." If this article applies to Türk's speech, doesn't it equally apply to the single sentence uttered in Kurdish by the leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) at the party's election rally in Diyarbakır? Isn't there a ban on using any language other than Turkish in political rallies? Doesn't this give credence to Türk's argument that speaking Kurdish is forbidden for Kurds, but free for the state?
The raison d'etre of the PKK and the DTP are the bans on the Kurdish language or, more correctly, the meaningless of these bans. This is the reason why the launching of a Kurdish-language TV channel by the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) offends the PKK and the DTP the most. The PKK has been urging and warning residents in the Southeast not to watch this channel. The DTP leader's speech in Kurdish shows that these bans are vital for the continuation of identity-based Kurdish politics. If the bans on the Kurdish language are abolished, identity-centered politics will become "meaningless."
Politicization
What Türk did was an act of civil disobedience, and it achieved its goal, regardless of anything you may argue to the contrary. In this new phase of the Kurdish issue, everyone should at least know the theory or rationale of civil disobedience. However, there is confusion about the political solution that is being offered as an alternative to the military solution. The mentality that rejects the political solution as the "politicization of terror and separatism" has not been sufficiently discussed.
The statement made by Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli in response to Türk's speech in Kurdish is proof that people are very confused in this new phase. While complaining about the "legitimization of political separatism," "the emergence of separatism in the political arena" and "the PKK's politicization strategy," Bahçeli does not realize that he is completely ruling out the "political vision." Bahçeli should have a clear understanding of where those words he uses lead and what they imply. On the other hand, the change in Turkey is obvious. The Kurdish issue is being transferred from the mountains of the Southeast to policymakers in the corridors of Parliament. This issue will now be solved not by people with weapons, but by Bahçeli.
Politicization means the end of violence, not the settlement of an existing problem. Democratic politics means choosing between attacks on military posts and civil disobedience. What Bahçeli is complaining about actually implies the stopping of the bloodshed. Turkey cannot settle its ethnic issue without stopping this bloodshed. It follows that this issue must be politicized to the highest extent possible.
The latest developments are sufficient to show that the Kurdish issue is moving from the weapon-based solution to the political axis. Kurdish politics is more prepared for this new condition than the political circles close to the state.
