By reviewing the practices in most European parliaments, where minority deputies are obliged to express themselves in the commonly accepted -- "national" -- language, one may argue that Türk "forces it." But, whether or not the right to speak in one's native language in a political context in places other than Parliament is protected in Turkey will be a polarizing issue.Kurds in Turkey feel relieved -- well, relatively, but considerably more than at any time before -- and act at ease when resorting to their native language. The more it becomes clear that the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) aims to release the pressure built on the domain of cultural rights, the more diverse the challenges in the process of change will be. TRT 6 broadcasts in Kurdish were a big step in raising the curtain to fresh scenery, and inevitably this change has now been exported to the open market of politics.
Put in the context of local elections, everything turns self-explanatory. Although seriously limping on macro reform issues for a long time, the AK Party seems rather decisive on walking some distance on the Kurdish issue. It is a complex picture, but almost all its components point to a major attempt to break the destructive equation based on "an armed struggle gives strength to a political one" regarding the DTP domination in the mainly Kurdish provinces.
AK Party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seems to be taking the Kurdish challenge very personally (as he resented the "no show" of Kurds whenever he visited Diyarbakır, that is, until his most recent trip) and has already declared the local elections a referendum on the decades-old policies of confrontation and a new policy of evolution of enhancing political and cultural rights and recognizing the identity of Turkey's Kurds.
The challenge for the DTP is, therefore, tougher than ever. It made a mistake by downplaying the significance of Kurdish broadcasts and therefore saw a gap widening between itself and parts of its traditional support base. It now feels the pressure of a lack of a comprehensive and modern political program that can compete with its sole competitor in the region -- the AK Party.
The fact of the matter is, the more the domain of freedom and rights is relieved of restrictions, the more exposed the demands of the voter base on fundamental economic expectations become. This is the first time a sign of normalization -- albeit a weak one -- has been seen in Turkey's thorny Kurdish issue. Should we wish to be optimistic, we would say it may show the way out.
Given the pattern, there are various thresholds. If one presumes that the AK Party marks even stronger progress in the region than before, compared to the DTP, particularly if it wins the Diyarbakır municipality, it will only be the beginning of an entire set of new challenges simply because such a show of strength will ascertain for us that a huge hole in the DTP's aspirations to keep and enhance political control of the region will have been filled. Other political actors will feel inspired, without a doubt, to then be inclusive of the Kurdish issue.
Such a scenario may come to mean that the DTP, as a political tool, will be weakened, but whether it will spill over to affect the presence of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) will be an open question because its raison d'être is what it has always been: rigid -- and for such a rigidity there is no normal political key by vote. The spring will be there, and the language of arms will be within reach, again.
From then on, namely once the AK Party is able to pass the election challenge, the question becomes even more internationalized. If the AK Party wins a possible victory to continue on the parallel paths of political and economic reform for the region in general, the DTP will feel even more challenged (if it will only be seen as a "go ahead" for economic measures, that will be another story), and in such a case the efforts of disarming and eventually dissolving PKK militants in Iraqi Kurdistan should bear fruit. The tasks before the AK Party may look laborious from April onwards: opening a consulate general in Arbil, working intensely in the "triple security mechanism" there for joint action and, after calling on the PKK command structures to lay down its arms, introducing a serious plan whereby a "homecoming" is made possible so that a gradual disarmament can start to be implemented. Once there, we can call it a success story. It is a long road ahead.
