The logic is simple. It is thanks to the surge that things turned around in Iraq. So what worked in Iraq should also work in Afghanistan. The bipartisan enthusiasm for this surge is so strong that there has been relatively little discussion of whether this strategy makes sense.
It is hard to argue that more troops will have no impact on the rapidly deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. The case for more troops was made forcefully by a US commander, Gen. David McKiernan, last September when he stated that to cope with rising violence he would need three more combat brigades, in addition to the extra brigade promised earlier. This amounts to adding 15,000 troops to the current force of about 35,000. As of last week the decision to send this additional force was already made.
Yet, at a time when the US is sending more troops and is lobbying its NATO allies to do the same, it is also important to remember that what really changed the situation in Iraq was not just the surge but the overall strategy. Despite Gen. David Petraeus's demonstrable success in Iraq, US forces in Afghanistan have, to this point, largely relied on conventional tactics -- raids, search-and-destroy missions and air attacks. As Gen. McKiernan also said, "It's not just more boots on the ground" that will bring success in Afghanistan, but a range of factors such as governance, economic development and relations with neighboring Pakistan. The idea to saturate that vast country with enough American soldiers to provide security for the population is therefore unrealistic.
Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan is predominantly rural, with a limited number of large population centers and roads requiring protection. Also unlike Iraq, Afghanistan is one of the world's poorest and most war-torn countries. The US should therefore embrace not only military but other more soft power goals, such as education, female literacy, central control of government services, drug eradication and a fight against corruption. This is all easier said than done. At best, many of these objectives will be realized partially, over very long periods. But one thing is certain: These objectives should not be measured as part of military campaigns. These are not goals best achieved by a military force. The central government of Hamid Karzai is very weak, dysfunctional and utterly corrupt. Many of the most corrupt elements in Kabul are allies of the West and have thus gained a kind of immunity.
This perhaps explains why European allies and Turkey are reluctant to send more troops to Afghanistan. This is also why as American and European officials ponder what to do about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, they are coming to the conclusion that the simplest way to stabilize the country may be to negotiate a truce with the Taliban.
Interestingly, Iraq provides important lessons here. A few years ago, it would have been unthinkable that the United States would consider any rapprochement with the Taliban militants. But the painful experience of Iraq has convinced many US commanders that you can take an enemy off the battlefield through negotiations. After all what made the surge a success in Iraq was not just the idea to send more troops but the decision to co-opt the Sunni tribes which were previously loyal to Saddam. Gen. Petraeus successfully pursued that strategy with Sunni insurgents in Iraq -- encouraging them to break with al-Qaeda and then forming alliances with them. Such dialogue with the enemy was much better than getting pinned down in protracted combat.
The good news is that Gen. Petraeus, who now has overall responsibility for the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan as CENTCOM commander, believes that the United States must work to separate the more moderate elements within the Taliban from the radicals allied with al-Qaeda and slowly draw them into the government. In short, success in Afghanistan will require much more than additional troops. The top objective should be to cut off al-Qaeda from its allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
