Both offered unwavering support to Turkey's EU accession process and the ongoing, if somewhat stalled, reform process. They both blamed each other for the fact that reforms have been very thin on the ground for the past few years, while claiming that the future would be different with reforms coming thick and fast. While Erdoğan crowed about his recent decision to appoint the dynamic and slick Egemen Bağış as Turkey's new chief EU negotiator, Baykal boasted that the CHP's new Brussels liaison office, which would serve as a permanent outpost between his party and those working on Turkey's dossier in the EU, would offer the EU a voice other than that of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and would keep Brussels informed about clandestine AK Party activities.
At the same time, both leaders failed to give totally polished performances. Erdoğan sparked a massive debate over the future of the Nabucco natural gas pipeline when he unfortunately dropped a clanger by linking its progress to Turkey's own progress in the accession negotiations and Turkey's energy chapter which, although it has no opening benchmarks, is still prevented from being put on the table due to French and Greek Cypriot objections. He may have done a U-turn on this later, but several weeks later, this off-the-cuff remark is still being talked about, and Turkey is being accused of blackmailing the EU. At the same time, Baykal's rhetoric about how his party had been supporting the EU process since 1963, is committed to Turkey having the same standards, values and rights as the rest of Europe, and, to this end, had been pushing and cajoling the AK Party over the lack of reform efforts was also going too far given that all of us who work on Turkey-EU relations have followed developments in Turkey, including the somewhat eccentric behavior of the CHP in recent times, and know that by any stretch of the imagination this is far from the truth.
So what does the EU make of all this? Well, they should be pleased, I guess, because if both Erdoğan and Baykal are true to their word about pressing on with reforms and not allowing the other to block the reform process, we should be in for a bonanza of reforms in the future. But somehow I just cannot see this happening, and I would say that the EU still remains somewhat skeptical about the future (particularly in light of the EU's own half-hearted approach to Turkey). There is a lot of suspicion that these recent activities have been for the benefit of Turkey's domestic audience. Indeed, some things like Baykal's sudden desire to see chador-clad women join the CHP -- given his outright opposition to lifting the headscarf ban in universities -- have not done him any favors.
The moment of truth will come after the March municipal elections. Are all these words going to be transformed into actions, or not? There are many well-known things that the EU would like to see Turkey move on -- from judicial reform, to minority rights and constitutional reform. But there are also a number of other issues that the EU would like Turkey to show strong political will and determination on, too -- for example Cypriot reunification and rapprochement with Armenia. A third is the Nabucco pipeline project. The January Ukraine-Russia gas dispute, which left a number of member states without gas, underscored once again the need for the EU to develop alternative supplies, including a southern corridor from the Caspian (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan). Although Turkey is not the only possible transit route, given that it would be possible to extend a route that already exists between Azerbaijan and Georgia under the Black Sea to Romania, it is the preferred one particularly given the current security situation in Georgia and the huge financial costs that would be necessary to go under the Black Sea.
But Turkey's objective to be a regional energy hub means that Ankara does not see itself as a transit state but rather a buyer and reseller of Caspian gas to European customers. This perspective is becoming an obstacle to the project. Clearly, Ankara is trying to secure itself a financially lucrative deal. Turkey should not shoot itself in the foot over this as Nabucco can be equally as beneficial to Turkey (given its over 60 percent dependency on Russian gas) as the EU. However, at the same time, the EU should find a way to unblock the blocked energy chapter and improve its dialogue with Ankara, speeding up the negotiation process to create an enhanced climate of good will. Will this be possible? Well, given that it will require vision and courage, it is probably as likely as Erdoğan and Baykal delivering on all their promises. But here's hoping anyway!
