There is no doubt that the necessity felt by both Erdoğan, after four years, and Baykal, after five years, to visit Brussels has to do with the fact that 2009 is a critical year for Turkey-EU relations. If Ankara fails to speed up reforms and to extend the customs union to include Greek Cyprus, and if peace negotiations between Turkish and Greek parts of Cyprus do not go anywhere, the member states that strongly oppose Turkish membership are likely to put pressure on the union to suspend accession talks with Ankara. In order to avoid such an eventuality, it is important for Ankara not only to continue with reforms but also to warm its relations with Brussels. That is why both visits were most welcome by the Europhiles in Turkey.
Baykal's visit actually carried far greater significance than Erdoğan's, since progress toward accession cannot be achieved without reforms being supported by the opposition. Clearly, reforms that paved the way for the start of accession talks in 2005 were achieved with the support of the CHP. Similarly, reforms have stalled since then partly because the CHP has actively opposed them. The CHP's negative stance on reforms has been such that many find Baykal's promises in Brussels to back reforms unreliable and suspect this is just a move to gain votes in the coming local elections in March. Why?
It is sufficient to remember the basics of Baykal's performance since 2004. In foreign policy, he opposed the Annan plan for a comprehensive solution on Cyprus that was put forward by the United Nations and supported by the EU, called on Erdoğan to refuse to accept the "framework for negotiations" adopted by the European Council and demanded the extension of the military operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq so as to target the Kurdish regional government. On the domestic front, he seized every opportunity to incite the military against the democratically elected government. He invited the military to stop the election of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül to presidency just because his wife wears a Muslim headscarf. He backed the statement placed on the Office of Chief of General Staff Web site on the night of April 27, 2007, opposing Gül's election. He participated in mass demonstrations, which turned out to be organized by people involved in the Ergenekon gang, which is currently on trial for charges of provoking a military intervention. Arguing it would otherwise lead to "clashes," he put pressure on the Constitutional Court to halt the presidential election by, without any constitutional basis, requiring that two-thirds of the deputies attend.
Baykal strongly opposed the initiative by the AKP to adopt a new and democratic constitution to replace the current one drawn up by the military regime in 1982. He claimed constitutions could only be renewed by "revolution." He appealed to the Constitutional Court against the amendments adopted by Parliament with nearly four-fifths majority to lift the headscarf ban for university students, and secured their abrogation. He agitated in favor of the closure case at the Constitutional Court against the AKP, which had received 47 percent of the national vote in the parliamentary elections of 2007. He opposed the amendment of Article 301 of the penal code, the biggest restriction on freedom of expression. He appealed to the Constitutional Court against the Law on Foundations, which aimed at broadening the rights of foundations. He opposed the law that aimed to legalize broadcasts in Kurdish. Last but not least, he declared himself to be an advocate for the Ergenekon gang, claiming the case against it aimed at nothing other than silencing the opposition.
As the local elections in March approach, the same Baykal is attempting to broaden the popular appeal of his party by enlisting veiled women and sheiks of religious brotherhoods, and promising Quran courses for every quarter in the cities. In this effort, he visits Brussels, accuses the Europeans of failing to understand his concern for secularism and promises to support reforms that do not conflict with his authoritarian understanding of secularism. Considering his totally unprincipled performance ever since assuming leadership of the CHP in 1992, it would be foolish to believe in his sincerity.
One explaining factor for the AKP's increasing share of the national vote is surely Baykal and his party's sinking credibility. This is very unfortunate for the country, which is much in need of a strong, credible and principled social democratic alternative. Baykal, however, has no chance of coming to power other than through a military intervention and interim regime. The best he can do for his party and country is to resign from party leadership and take his clique away with him.
