This type of political party puts an emphasis on popular demands and sensitivities; for this reason, they mostly act pragmatically and eclectically. The other is called the "ideological party."
Rather than popular support, these parties pay attention to their ideological position; for this reason, they are particularly eager to rely on a set of consistent policies and actions no matter how marginal these policies and actions might be. Naturally, every ideological party has ambitions to become a mass party. If this were to happen, their ideas would become widespread, and a new era would start; in this era, the content of democracy would also change. Conversely, there has probably never been a mass party in a Western democracy that has aimed to become an ideological party. After all, what party would want to remain distanced from society, act within a restricted sphere and be left on the political sidelines?
But we have such a case in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP) seems to be engaged in a systematic strategy of distancing itself from popular demands and preferences and has caged itself within an ideological position. Actions implying that it is eager to act otherwise look pretty unnatural; it is as though these actions were staged not to be taken seriously. For instance, the ceremony held admitting women in chadors as new members of the party was a pathetic example of this. This attempt was unconvincing and hilarious. This move was inconsistent with the CHP's long-standing policy of marginal laicism; besides, these women were not actually admitted as members. In other words, this move did not point to a change in the overall stance of the party; besides, party officials did not any pay attention at all to not undermining the party's image and prestige. On the other hand, this case is not a first. The CHP attempted to maintain ties with Alevis via discourse on "Anatolian Islam" and with the Kurds by relying on the "identity is honor" rhetoric. However, subsequent moves did not follow, but more importantly, the party failed to present these moves as serious intentions and policies to deal with the respective problems. It was like this party was generating these in an attempt to get media attention and failing to keep its promises shortly after the announcement of these policies.
It is not possible to argue that the CHP administration is not aware of the simplest rules of public relations and politics. We cannot possibly assert that a political party, which has competent bodies, mechanisms and advisors, fails to appreciate the necessity of these rules and basic requirements of politics. In this case, how should we view this strategy, which is undermining the CHP's image? An important clue may be that these moves were surprising even to members of the party. All these moves were staged as part of the tactics of a limited number of party executives without obtaining the consent of all party members.
If this is the case, should we blame CHP leader Deniz Baykal for imprudence? A superficial approach may lead us to such a conclusion. However, when we consider the CHP leadership along with its potential alternatives, the case becomes pretty different. There is no real alternative to Baykal, and any probable opponent within the party may actually lead to a greater failure for the CHP in the elections. Baykal has created this situation by eliminating his rivals at every stage. But party members did not object to Baykal's attempts because everyone knew the situation would become worse if he were overthrown.
Currently, the CHP seems to have secured a 20 percent popular support by relying on more ideologically focused discourse and manipulating fears of Islamism in society. This may fall slightly over time, but even steady support of 20 percent should be seen as political success. The CHP's unusual moves -- i.e., the chador move -- are reflections of this state of inability to generate proper policies. Baykal makes these attempts to make sure that the party is left with no viable political alternatives. In this way, the ground for fertile and productive discussions vanishes in the party, and CHP politics turn into the public relations strategy of Baykal.
In short, Baykal's actual policy is not to generate counterarguments against other parties or to look for how to respond to popular demands. His actual policy is to secure popular support of 15-20 percent by taking the CHP out of the political sphere. Because this strategy seriously weakens his party, no viable alternative emerges against Baykal, and eventually the need for Baykal's leadership becomes stronger. Today, the main opposition party is a political toy in the hands of Baykal. However, this situation, which would normally be seen as imprudence and a lack of foresight, may also be seen as success from Baykal's standpoint. Think about how the deputies of this party still praise their leader in spite of the party's discourse having become outdated and its emphasis on laicism no longer being taken seriously.
Currently, the CHP is not a party that has created an opposition void; quite the contrary, it is a party that is able to survive because of this opposition void. And Baykal did this by taking gradual steps to make the party less political and perceiving party politics as a circus performance.
