The chief of general staff at the time, Gen. Hilmi Özkök, talked last summer about the diaries of the admiral and about the coup plots in an affirmative manner. He said he could neither approve of nor deny the coup attempts, but added that he would be prepared to testify in court if he was asked. Özkök also confirmed the allegations that there had been attempts on his life in 2004.
It is clear today that the diaries of Örnek are authentic. The admiral himself dropped the case against Alper Görmüş who published parts of it in Nokta, implicitly acknowledging the authenticity of the diary.
All this shows that we came very close to a military coup in 2004 as contemplated by the commanders of the main forces in the Turkish military, according to Örnek's dairies. It appears that Özkök managed to resist the plotters with or without the support of Turkey's allies abroad.
What strikes me most is the historical juncture of the coup plots. Remember the years 2003 and 2004: a single-party government committing itself to EU membership and embarking on comprehensive reforms in order to get a date for accession talks, with public support for EU membership reaching over 75 percent. It was also a period when Turkey for the first time appeared determined to solve the Cyprus question, pursuing a policy of being "one step ahead of the Greek-Cypriots."
Imagine. While a country mobilized, trying to get a date for accession negotiations from the EU, and the EU moving gradually to see Turkey's progress as "meeting the Copenhagen political criteria," some in the military were contemplating the most unthinkable actions: destroying democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and breaking with the West by staging a direct military coup. While everyone was busy trying to persuade the Europeans that the Turkish reforms were irreversible, top-ranking generals in the army were busy planning a coup.
The haste of the coup plotters indeed had a lot to do with the EU process. As expressed in the admiral's diaries, the plotters wanted to finish the job before the end of 2004, concerned that "the EU may give what the government was asking for by then, making it very difficult to justify any action against the government afterward." What that meant was the start of accession negotiations with the EU.
They were planning to use the Cyprus question -- the "national cause" for many people in Turkey -- as a case to mobilize the masses against the EU and the government. Planning a military coup, they were aware that Turkey's Western allies, the US and EU member states, would not support such a move during such a timeframe. For them, it was the will of the US, not the will of the Turkish people, that had brought the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to power. Besides, the US not only needed the AK Party government's support in its war in Iraq but also had to rely on the AK Party to pursue its Greater Middle East Initiative. As for the EU, it was obvious that a military coup in Turkey would be intolerable. The plotters would not mind breaking with the EU; in fact it was more desirable to pursue their notion of "independent Turkey" policies.
The coup therefore had to be one not only against the AK Party government, but also against the West. The former secretary-general of the National Security Council (MGK), Tuncer Kılınç, pointed to an alternative in 2002: an alliance with Russia, Iran and China. This was indicative of their strategic vision.
This old story tells us much about the first phase of the Ergenekon organization.
