In both cases, Israel was provoked by proxies of Iran that either kidnapped Israeli soldiers or sent rocket fire into Israeli territories. In both cases Israel responded with air attacks followed by a ground invasion. The war against Hezbullah during the summer of 2006 turned into a nightmare for Israel. Tel Aviv lost its most cherished asset: the ability to deter its enemies by inflicting a massive retaliation that would destroy them. Hezbullah was not destroyed. To the contrary, it emerged as the victor. Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbullah, became the most popular political figure in the Arab world.
Today, the Israeli government claims it has learned its lessons. Gaza is a more hospitable terrain than southern Lebanon, and Hamas is militarily weaker than Hezbullah. This may be so, but Israel fails to understand a crucial factor about the nature of the enemy it is facing. This is no longer 1967, when the Israelis faced Arab states and armies. Hamas and Hezbullah are not states, they are nationalist movements. Hamas and Hezbullah have another major trait in common: Their definition of victory is not military success. They don't have regular armies. They define victory as survival. They don't care about civilian casualties as much as a nation-state would. To the contrary, civilian casualties bring them a sense of moral victory against Israel's aggression. These casualties boost their sense of victimization and frustration. In the long run, it prepares them for revenge. Every day this war continues, Hamas grows politically stronger, as do its allies Syria and Iran. All Hamas has to do is find a way to keep firing rockets into Israel to claim some sort of victory.
Tel Aviv believed it could substantially reduce Hamas' military capacity and then force it to accept a cease-fire. Hamas, however, has no incentive to agree to a new truce unless Israel agrees to end its economic blockade. This situation leaves Israel with two options. Israel must choose between attempting to drive Hamas from power -- this is nearly impossible because it would mean permanent occupation of Gaza and significant Israeli casualties -- and a second option of withdrawing without any assurance that Hamas rocket fire against Israeli cities would cease.
In the meantime, international sympathy for Israel is crumbling. The European Union and the United Nations are now demanding a cease-fire. Even in the United States, there is a debate about what is a "proportional" response to Hamas's rockets. A recent opinion poll showed that Democratic voters were opposed to the Israeli attack on Gaza by a margin of 22 percent.
The Israeli government argues it had no alternative other than invading Gaza. Hamas, in their eyes, is not a political movement in charge but just a terrorist organization that forced Israel's hand. Yet, there was an alternative that Tel Aviv never considered: to relax the economic blockade of Gaza in return for extending the six-month cease-fire. There was indeed relative quiet in the past six months, when Israel and Hamas observed a semi-truce. Polls conducted by Palestinians showed that Hamas's support was falling in Gaza and the West Bank. Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority president and Fatah leader, was beginning to talk about holding new elections because he thought he could win.
Egypt, in the meantime, was working on brokering a deal between the two Palestinian parties. There was even a split emerging within Hamas, mainly between those who wanted to recognize Israel and hard-liners who wanted to draw Israel into a fight. Israel could have helped the moderates by offering to lift its economic blockade of Gaza in exchange for a continued cease-fire. Instead, Israel appears to have done the opposite. In November, the blockade became harsher, putting serious pressure on the supply of food and fuel into Gaza. Ending the blockade of Gaza in return for a cease-fire was the best option -- for both humanitarian and strategic reasons.
Now the best Israel can hope for is an agreement with international forces to help stop the smuggling of new weapons from Egypt into Gaza. But that won't stop Hamas from continuing to build its own rockets and firing them at Israel. Like Hezbullah in Lebanon, Hamas will therefore claim victory because it successfully resisted an Israeli invasion. At the end of the day, Israel is once again learning the hard way that nationalist movements simply cannot be eliminated by military means.
