The PKK's strategy aims to emerge as the single legitimate representative of the Kurdish people. To this end, it even turns a blind eye to some opportunities for a solution. The PKK thinks it can create room for political maneuver by monopolizing what Kurds want. On the other hand, by refraining from openly stating what Kurds want, it tries not to diminish its capacity for any future bargaining.The governments, which are materially and spiritually blockaded by the military in this issue, give indirect support to the PKK's strategy. This is because the state does not have any idea how this issue should be solved. It fears that the limited steps toward solution may heighten expectations. On the other hand, we know that radical steps that would strengthen the democratic mechanism will fundamentally change the existing power structures. Thus, the Kurdish issue turns into fuzzy politics of objections, which become complicated as people start to talk about it. The general uncertainty about demands causes even concrete demands such as linguistic rights to be viewed with this perspective. For this reason, there is a general misconception that recognition of any democratic right might be lead to a subsequent series of political concessions.
This paralysis of the state obviously plays into the PKK's hands. A significant number of Kurds who see a state which never takes a step to improve their situation and which refrains from giving them the most basic citizenship rights come to think that they need the bargaining power of the PKK though they do not sympathize with its policies. In this way, the Kurdish issue becomes a ball of problems with unlikely solutions, and this further fuels the process of monopolization on both sides and undermines the grounds for democratic discussions.
In order to break with this vicious cycle, Kurds should be able to talk freely to overcome the ideological and psychological domination of the PKK and this talk should be heard by the other groups in the country. The question, "What do Kurds want?" must at once be cleared of all uncertainties and ambiguities, and a clear answer should be given to it. The report by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), issued last week, is an attempt to find an answer to this question. As a method, a two-stage preparation was adopted. First, a workshop was conducted with the participation of about 20 Kurdish intellectuals from different political affiliations and professional organizations, and these intellectuals were asked to define the Kurdish issue and suggest possible solutions. A text was created using their definitions and possible solutions. Naturally, this text included the opinions which received wider acceptance as well as those with lesser support, and this was explicitly stated in the text. After this text was approved by all participants of the workshop, it was sent to about 15 Kurdish intellectuals as jointly agreed by the participants of the workshop, and they were requested to specify their assessments and opinions about the text. The proposals made by these 15 Kurdish intellectuals were presented to the workshop participants, and thus, the text was modified a number of times. This process continued until everyone agreed on the text.
Accordingly, this report does not present the opinions and proposals of TESEV, but the perspectives of Kurds who represent the Kurdish population in a diversified manner. The Kurdish intellectuals involved in the study included not only those who feel closer to the PKK, but also those who are strictly against this organization. The resulting text touches on a number of topics, important or insignificant, because different people naturally have different sensitivities, and no one conceded to the exclusion of a topic which s/he regards as important.
On the other hand, this diversity of issues is actually a chance for the government as these issues include many which can be solved immediately without causing many ideological problems for the government. However, anyone who reads the report will understand that the Kurdish issue cannot be settled through simple palliative measures. Indeed, all Kurds have a common perception of the state irrespective of the PKK's influence. Simply put, Kurds do not trust the state and believe that the people acting on behalf of the state are not sincere. Whatever step is to be taken, the most pressing issue is to create this sincerity.
TESEV's report also offers another opportunity. Perhaps this is the first time we have a framework for reform acceptable to all groups ranging from the PKK to the other extreme. Therefore, the state does not have to talk with any representative of the Kurds. It just needs to pay attention to this report. Thus, for the first time, the two parties have a chance to establish an indirect relationship with each other thanks to this text.
To what extent this opportunity can be realized will largely depend on the political foresight of the parties. But whatever step is taken, both sides will now have to pay attention to the method. Indeed, the method of approaching the Kurdish issue was a controversial topic. The steps that do not rely on Kurds' participation will not be accepted as legitimate. Perhaps "sincerity" will now be tested in this way.
