In order to respond to these questions, it is necessary to compare the domestic and international context that prevailed between 2002 and 2004 -- when the AKP government delivered reforms that have rightly been referred to as constituting a "silent revolution" -- and in its aftermath. In the former period, Gen. Hilmi Özkök was the chief of staff, and the military gave its support to EU reforms. Coup plotters could not enlist the backing of the military. The main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), endorsed the EU harmonization bills. Most commentators in the media, including those in the Doğan group, were also supportive. Public backing for the EU membership rose to about 75 percent. The outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was still keeping to the cease-fire that it unilaterally declared in 1999. There was full support in Europe, including France and Germany, for reform in Turkey. In the middle of 2004, 10 new members including Greek Cyprus, which rejected the Kofi Annan plan for the reunification of the island, joined the EU. The PKK resumed its attacks. In the summer of 2005, the debate on the draft EU constitution in Europe displayed growing opposition to enlargement in general and to Turkish membership in particular. Angela Merkel, who became chancellor of Germany in November of that year, offered privileged partnership instead of full membership to Turkey. Nicolas Sarkozy, who was elected president of France in May 2007, declared there was no place for Turkey in the EU. The EU council decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005, but the "negotiation framework" adopted did not assure full membership even if negotiations were to be concluded successfully. Public support for EU membership in Turkey began to decline and soon dropped below 50 percent.
Following the attack in May 2006 on the Council of State in Ankara and the killing of one of its justices, clouds began to gather over Turkish politics. The fight over the presidential election to be held in 2007 had started. In the spring of 2007, anti-government rallies were staged by ultranationalists (now defendants in the Ergenekon case) against the candidacy of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül. The CHP declared that the AKP was intent on subverting secularism and opposed Gül's candidacy and all reform legislation. On April 27, the General Staff, in a memorandum posted on its official Web site, threatened to intervene if Gül were elected. The Constitutional Court declared Gül's election to the presidency by Parliament unconstitutional. The AKP government responded by announcing early general elections, which it won in a landslide, and subsequently, elected Gül as president. Tensions between the state elite and the AKP government did not, however, subside.
The Doğan papers initiated an aggressive opposition campaign against the AKP government, accusing it of violating secularism. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) began to resort to tactics of confronting the AKP with the state elites. The PKK escalated its attacks. The pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) increasingly aligned itself with the PKK. The Bush administration in the US did not move a finger against the PKK in Iraq until November 2007. The neocon gang in Washington intensified its campaign against the AKP. France added four to the already suspended eight chapters in the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey. Little progress was made in negotiations. It was revealed that the Ergenekon gang was conspiring for a military coup in 2009. The chief prosecutor filed a closure case against the AKP. The Constitutional Court ruled that it had the authority to examine constitutional amendments not only with respect to procedure but also to substance, effectively declaring a juristocracy (rule by jurists). The AKP narrowly escaped closure by the Constitutional Court. The CHP escalated corruption allegations against the AKP. And finally, the economic crisis arrived at the door.
The AKP, which was able to gain the support of nearly half of voters in the general elections last year, finds itself besieged in all directions. Under such circumstances, it has basically two options: To energetically continue reforms relying on popular support and supporters in the EU, or to surrender to the state elites, to the status quo. Since the first option is too risky, it chooses to make a deal with the status quo to continue to enjoy the benefits of being in power. Even circles that supported the AKP while it introduced reforms begin to turn against it.
So far, it is understandable. But how can the increasingly nationalistic discourse of the AKP be explained? Perhaps the AKP leadership sees the MHP as its major rival in the coming local elections. It appears to be a serious miscalculation. If it insists on this line of policy, it may indeed be the beginning of the end of the AKP's power.
