It seems that, supported by the West, Mikhail Saakashvili, Georgia's young leader, inadvertently rushed into making a miscalculated move that could have far-reaching implications. Obviously, Saakashvili is acting on an extraordinary trust he had in the US and his other Western allies, even at the expense of ignoring regional power balances.Whether Saakashvili has been provoked into action by Russia or encouraged by the US, or whether he is acting with a complete lack of foresight and prudence will not change the consequences of his attempt to solve the longstanding South Ossetia and Abkhazia issues through use of force. Moreover, it will not be Saakashvili's country alone that pays the price of the conflicts sparked and the many others that may ensue. The heavy price to be paid in connection with this conflict could closely concern Turkey, the other countries in the region and the West.
"No great power retreats forever," Henry Kissinger had said, and these words best summarize what Saakashvili is willing to ignore. This is because upon Georgia's harsh actions, Russia has stopped the long retreat to Moscow that started under Gorbachev. Apart from halting its retreat, Russia may have given start to the process of returning to the territories that have left its control or influence. Tbilisi not only miscalculated the strength of Russia, which is quickly recovering, but also ignored the well-known principle of international affairs that "no superpower will commit suicide for the sake of its small ally," due to its unfaltering trust in the US.
It would be wrong to regard Russia's harsh response as its intention to protect South Ossetia from Georgian attacks or to assume that the sole target of Russian attacks is the Tbilisi administration. By intervening in South Ossetia and Georgia, Russia has given a stong and clear message of a "return to a balance of powers" to the US, NATO and the West. As this message is addressed to big players, its magnitude extends much farther than that of the South Ossetia crisis. It can be argued that although the Russians were the losers of the Cold War, they never stopped seeing themselves as a superpower and have finally acted to recover their national pride after 18 years of coarse disparagement by the West. One should have predicted that the economic, political and military power that the Putin administration has been accumulating for years would not be used for other purposes.
The time is not yet ripe for a clear analysis of the consequences of the Georgian-Russian conflict, as what course it will follow is yet to be known. Yet we can engage in mental exercises into possible outcomes of the recent developments, which have the potential of disrupting the regional and global balances even in its current form. Moreover, we need to perform a comprehensive assessment of damage and implement an effective damage-control mechanism. With this approach in mind, I have arrived at certain conclusions, which I would like to share with you:
First, we can safely argue that the pro-US Saakashvili will soon have to resign from office and that the era ushered in by his Rose Revolution will end. From now on, for the West, the lesser of two evils in Tbilisi will be an Eduard Shevardnedze-like leader who will give full weight to Russian interests while being partially sensitive to Western interests. Everyone can expect to see an era when Russian consent will be sought in all Western projects that will be implemented not only in Georgia, but also in the entire Caucasus.
The unipolar world order in which a single power (the US) rules despite all its problems, or in more diplomatic or convenient terms, the post-Cold War era, has effectively ended with the Georgian-Russian conflict. Russia, which was the US's foe in the bipolar world order of the Cold War era, has returned to its place in the global power equilibrium, a place that has been vacant for years.
The aggressive US-led efforts of the West to democratize the countries formerly controlled or influenced by the former USSR and make them Western allies will no longer be carried out with ease. As Russia demonstrated its reaction to the independence of Kosovo by intervening in the South Ossetia issue, we can expect it to give direct or indirect responses or retaliation to every step taken by the West.
In all projects realized or planned for the transfer of Caspian energy resources to the West (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, Nabucco, etc.), the Russian factor will be given greater weight, and all plans will lose feasibility without Russian involvement or consent.
We all have seen, as in the case of Georgia, that there is nothing much that the US, the EU and NATO can do against the Russian return. It is obvious that the West will not dare to start a third world war for the sake of Georgia or similar countries. However this does not imply that this region will be left completely to Russian influence. At this stage, we can argue that a new and different cold war era will start. In other words, a much more adventurous world awaits us, where tactics and diplomatic and strategic moves will follow each other. For instance, no one should be surprised if the US, the EU and NATO launch their countermove against Russia in Ukraine. While Georgia's NATO membership has now become impossible, Ukraine may see quick approval of its application for NATO membership.
It will not be possible to convince anyone that long-range missile systems situated in Eastern European countries by the US and NATO under the pretext of an Iran threat do not target Russia. So we can predict that Russia will boost its armament in response, giving start to another arms race. Likewise, it is perfectly predictable that Russia will pursue much more aggressive policies in the former USSR geography.
