The Russian Army launched an intensive bomb campaign against Georgian military targets and seized control of South Ossetia on Aug. 9. The same day, the Abkhaz troops gave start to a military operation to force Georgia out of the upper Kodori Gorge, under Tbilisi's control since 1992. This created a second front for Georgian troops.Availing itself of this opportunity, the Russian Federation is determined to keep this war going until it discourages the Saakashvili administration, which pursues harsh policies against the Russian Federation, and pushes Saakashvili back well beyond the point where the war started. For this reason, it would not be a surprise if the Abkhaz troops completely capture the upper Kodori Gorge in several days. Indeed, this extremely mountainous region is controlled more by the legendary Georgian commander Emzar Kvistiani and his special operations unit than by Tbilisi. Despite his heroic fight against Abkhazia between 1991 and 1992, Kvistiani was unable to develop good relations with Saakashvili, who had tried to get rid of Kvistiani but failed, due to the latter's setting up an autonomous zone in the region with help from Abkhazia and Russia. Therefore one can conclude that Abkhaz troops will not have much difficulty in capturing the upper Kodori Gorge with help from Kvistiani. If Saakashvili insists on maintaining the war, the second move by the Russian Federation would be to launch aerial strikes against Georgia's economic infrastructure. With Moscow's aerial bombardment, the military infrastructure of Georgian has already been degraded back to its status at the time of disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. If its economic infrastructures sustain similar damage, this will bring hard days for Georgia.
There were expectations that Georgia's young and ambitious President Saakashvili would try to reinforce its weakened power with a military success and ease the path to NATO membership for the country by making Abkhazia and South Ossetia part of Georgia again. Indeed, in the NATO Bucharest summit held April 2-4, Georgia was not admitted as a NATO member, creating much disappointment in the Georgian nation. The biggest obstacle before Georgia's integration with Europe and the Atlantic world (through NATO and EU membership) is the de facto independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. However it may be the Kremlin that had encouraged politically inexperienced Saakashvili to use force against Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is because both the Saakashvili administration and its political opposition seek integration with the West. On the other hand, the Kremlin is against further Georgian integration with the West and is well aware of the fact that the political balance in Tbilisi can only be changed after a heavy military defeat. Kremlin may estimate that a heavy defeat and ensuing economic crisis may ensure that politicians who would pursue a more balanced policy toward the Russian Federation will assume office in Tbilisi.
Politics is the art of capturing, to the extent of one's capacity. Saakashvili's ambitions to maintain his power and his desire to obtain Georgia's territorial integrity as quickly as possible preceded Georgia's hopes for integration with the West.
The US, the EU and Turkey have been conducting efforts to ensure that the South Ossetia and Abkhazia issues are solved through negotiation, as this would avert any confrontation with the Russian Federation. Saakashvili's haste gave the Russian Federation the golden opportunity that it had been waiting for. To maintain sustainable peace and eliminate disagreements in the southwestern Caucasus, tensions must first be eased in a controlled manner. Moreover, Georgia's targets for integration with the West are much more important than the continuation of Saakashvili's power. Thus this is the end of the road for Saakashvili, whose ambitions go well beyond his political and military capabilities, and who has lost the support of Georgian intellectuals.
