Let me start on a positive note: The US government's soul-searching on how to deal with Turkey's severe crisis on the right balance between democracy and secularism seems to have borne some fruit.
It all started with an unfortunate "we don't take sides" approach on the part of Bush administration when the Turkish military issued a veiled coup threat (the infamous e-memorandum) against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in April 2007. The spirit of the Bush administration's freedom and democracy agenda has gone into the bottle, while the soul (or soullessness) of Cold War national security pragmatism came back out of its bottle: When the Turkish military speaks, everybody in Washington listens. (And when Washington only listens, doing nothing, the Turkish military usually speaks even more.)
The same scenario played out once again. Even though the military did not directly intervene, as in the good old Cold War days, the AK Party's overwhelming election victory in July 2007 -- despite, or perhaps thanks to coup threats -- only further infuriated Turkey's ruling establishment. With the military behind the scenes (because they are concerned about erosion of their "non-partisan" public image and don't want to look too anti-religious), they came up with an innovative coup under the guise of judicial independence. A ruling party that got 47 percent of the votes just a few months ago was put on trial for undermining secularism, with the end goal being a ban. No matter how shocking it was in Washington, the "we don't take sides" approach generally persisted, with some emphasis, though, on the need for listening to the "will of the voters."
Perhaps we should have taken this as normal, because many in the US nation and among its representatives in Washington have lost part of their democratic souls due to Sept. 11 trauma. No matter how moderate they are, the fact that the AK Party and the wide socioeconomic sector it represents have a religious Islamic background was certainly not a truly comforting factor in a post-Sept. 11 West. However the commitment of Turkey's old establishment to win the internal power struggle -- again disguised as if it is a war for preserving Turkey's secular soul -- even if it costs Turkey's EU membership process, seems to have increasingly worried Americans. The "we don't take sides" approach is being slowly replaced by a more concerned tone over Turkey's direction. US officials increasingly and correctly contend that without EU prospects, a crucial strategic goal, Turkey may be unable to continue with its more than century-long reformation and modernization process. They underline strategic relevance of Turkish democracy.
When asked, "What can we do, or what can some other countries do to make sure that we don't lose democracy in a very important country?" at a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) meeting last week, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice offered the following:
"Secular democracy in Turkey is important, but it is also important that religious people are a part of the country. … We need to continue to speak up for reform in Turkey, for democracy in Turkey, for secular democracy in Turkey. … The prospect of European Union accession has been extremely important to reform in Turkey. And without that prospect, it is going to be hard to continue."
Rice also thinks "the people who could do the most are the Europeans." However the US should not underestimate its own clout in Ankara. Apparently a result of a deliberate decision to speak up on the matter, a prominent spokesman for Turkey affairs in the administration, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matt Bryza, sent a clearer message on Tuesday at a Washington Institute event. He essentially said that if Turkey's EU process is put on hold due to a closure of AK Party, it would "harm US national interest" and "would be quite unfortunate if the way a political debate is resolved is through banning a party." He also signaled the US would stay short of issuing any ultimatums or threats to Turkey. But the new willingness to speak a little more assertively on this painful topic was a remarkable step forward for the Bush administration.
The US should not be shy or worried a powerful stance for democracy would diminish secularism in Turkey in any way. True, there is a soul struggle in Turkey. But it's not mainly about Turkey's secular soul vs. its religious soul. It's more about soul-searching for how true democracy should look like in a predominantly Muslim country. There is also genuine soul-searching within Turkey's religiously motivated segments on how to deal with democracy and secularism. These processes are not new and have already reached a point where one can comfortably say that every major social and political trend now suggests Turkey will remain secular, democratic and religious.
We don't need an "occasional dose of secular fascism" (as Roger Cohen of The New York Times recently argued) to keep Turkey on its path toward integration with the West. That would be totally counterproductive. What Turkey needs is a regular dose of reform (guaranteed by EU prospects), which will not be possible under secular or religious fascism.
