Let's first take up the domestic scene, and begin with illegal actors in Turkish politics. The "deep state," or the "dark side of Turkey," i.e., the various underground gangs with roots in the state apparatus, have not since the AKP's entrance into power spared any efforts to provoke a military coup. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has, through armed provocation, done everything in its power to discredit and weaken a government that has for the first time in the country's history spoken of "mistakes and sins" committed by the state toward its citizens of Kurdish descent. Coming to the legal actors in Turkish politics, it is clear that Turkey's military and civilian bureaucracy, with its strong commitment to an authoritarian type of nationalism and secularism (dubbed Kemalism) that has no tolerance for the expression of religious and ethnic identities, is strongly in favor of banning the AKP, which appears to be intent on democratizing the Turkish political system and taking away the privileges of the bureaucratic establishment.
The main opposition party, i.e., the Republican People's Party (CHP), has made it quite clear that it is in favor of the closure, warning the AKP not to attempt to amend the Constitution to bring regulations concerning the closure and prohibition of political parties in line with European norms. The second-largest opposition party, i.e., the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), is not hiding its hopes of raising its share of the vote in an eventual election without the AKP and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, after having proposed and supported the constitutional amendments to lift the headscarf ban in universities, the biggest crime against secularism according to the chief prosecutor.
The two leading opposition parties have proved that they have little respect for majority rule, which is the basic principle of a liberal democratic regime. They have scant respect for minority rights, the other main principle of liberal democracy, as they make it clear that they would be more than happy to see the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) also closed down by the Constitutional Court.
Judging by the philosophy that prevails among its members and by its past verdicts, it would be a big surprise for the Constitutional Court's verdict on the closure cases to be anything less than what the chief prosecutor has demanded. Still, the AKP leadership seems to have decided, after lengthy discussions, not to fight closure by introducing constitutional amendments. There are two declared reasons for the choice of this line of behavior: First, since "the AKP values Turkey's national interests more than anything else," it is ready to sacrifice itself rather than cause further political polarization and instability by seeking constitutional amendments, which are not certain to be adopted by Parliament with the necessary qualified majority or by the electorate in an eventual referendum. And second, because the AKP leadership believes that the Constitutional Court's verdict is not predetermined.
What, then, is the position of civil society on the AKP closure case? The opinion writers of the largest media group are with few exceptions continuously attacking the AKP for allegedly Islamizing society and undermining the secular nature of the regime. Even among those who call themselves liberals or democrats, there are many who, rather than defending the principles of democracy and the rule of law, choose to accuse the AKP of having neglected EU reforms, failing to properly address the fears of the "secularists" who feel their lifestyles threatened, etc.
In sum, for those who care about democracy in Turkey an extremely worrying scene prevails, whereby a large part of both political and civil society is failing to come out in defense of the principles of democracy and the rule of law.
Who cares for democracy and the rule of law in Turkey in the outside world, among the partners and allies of Turkey? That will be the topic of another column.
