The crisis is basically a reflection of the power struggle between Turkey's old elite (composed primarily of military and civilian bureaucracy) and Anatolia-based business and professional elite, represented by the AKP. The former sees its privileges threatened by the latter and seems to be determined to hinder the country's further progress toward consolidating democracy, thus hindering its accession to the European Union.Many blame the AKP government itself for the current crisis. It is argued that the opponents of Turkey's further democratization and Europeanization were encouraged to move against the AKP when it failed to continue the reform process it had energetically pursued between 2002 and 2005, and sought instead consensus with the status quo forces. This is surely part of the truth, but does not account for the loss of enthusiasm for reforms in the AKP government. I believe that the failure of European and American partners and allies to provide support for democratization reforms in Turkey has played a role in this. Let me explain.
The EU, which declared in 1999 that Turkey was destined to become a member of the union on the same conditions as the other candidate countries, changed its mind in 2005 and began offering a second-class membership (with permanent safeguards and derogations to be deployed even if accession negotiations were concluded successfully) or "privileged partnership" instead of full membership, with France declaring Turkey had no place in Europe. Greek Cypriots, who said no to the UN and EU-backed Annan plan for the reunification of the island, joined the EU, whereas the international isolation of the Turkish Cypriots who approved the plan continued.
These negative signals coming from the EU have drastically diminished if not extinguished the EU's "soft power" over Turkey. Public support for EU membership declined from above 70 percent in 2004 to about 40 percent. As public support waned, the nationalist opposition to EU reforms festered. Those who wanted to get rid of the AKP government by any means began to resort to pressures and provocations well-described in the European Stability Initiative's report on "Turkey's dark side."
Washington, by punishing Ankara in various ways for having refused to become a partner to the crime of invading Iraq, has also indirectly contributed to the current crisis in Turkey. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) based in northern Iraq, for fear of losing ground among Turkey's Kurds if the EU reforms were to continue to democratize the country, escalated its attacks beginning in the summer of 2004. Washington, by denying Ankara effective cooperation against the PKK, has helped foment the xenophobic nationalist, anti-US and anti-West upsurge in Turkey that accuses the AKP of collaborating with foreign interests. It is perhaps the realization of this that finally, in late 2007, convinced Washington to begin effective cooperation with Ankara against the PKK.
Is it possible to turn the current crisis into an opportunity for further democratization and Europeanization of Turkey? Perhaps. Nowadays the AKP government seems to better understand how its failure to pursue the EU reforms after 2005 has weakened its position against its opponents, who seem determined to use all available means to push it out of power. It now seems more likely that the AKP, or in the event it is closed, the party which will replace it, may revitalize the reform process and move Turkey ever closer to Europe.
European Commission President José Manuel Barroso's April 10-12 visit to Turkey together with Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn and the statements they made during the visit are perhaps indications of increased awareness in Brussels that politics in Turkey may take a very ugly turn if the EU fails to provide credible support for Turkish accession. The EU has provided strong and credible support to the accession of Southern, Central and Eastern European countries, and thus helped them consolidate their democracies. Really, why not do so for Turkey?
