There is absolutely no reason for the government to avoid talking about measures necessary for the solution of the problem with the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP). The promised demilitarization of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) requires measures designed as a comprehensive peace and reconciliation project. The Constitution has assigned the duty of representing the whole nation to the president of the republic. We, therefore, demand that the president assumes an active role in promoting the solution of the problem. According to press reports, Gül told the group of intellectuals that the state is working on a project to demilitarize the PKK, that the military is also involved in the project and that the military does not perceive the problem as being solely a security issue. He said the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) will soon start broadcasts in Kurdish that will target Kurdish women in particular, adding that he was in dialogue with the DTP.
The day the letter was presented to Gül, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan -- in what seemed to be a response to Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdish regional administration, who had complained about Turkish air operations in northern Iraq -- stated that the option of a ground operation in northern Iraq was on the table. The same day an entry on YouTube noted that the ground operation was to take place on Feb. 20-22. According to a prominent Turkish columnist, Ahmet Altan, the PKK representatives he had recently interviewed in the Kandil Mountains had told him they were expecting a ground operation to follow the air operations. When the ground operation started on Feb. 21, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that it was aimed solely at the PKK in northern Iraq and that the local population would in no way be harmed. It was announced the same day that Gül had invited Iraqi President Jalal Talabani to Ankara, an invitation that was avoided by former Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer.
What will the Turkish ground operation lead to? In order to be able to address this question it is necessary to remember the background of the current phase of Turkey's fight against the PKK. When at the end of last October the PKK escalated its attacks against Turkey from bases in northern Iraq, its plan appeared to be to provoke Ankara to take hard-line measures against the pro-Kurdish political parties in the country and to invade northern Iraq. Support for the PKK among Turkey's Kurds was declining due partly to recognition of some cultural rights of the Kurds in Turkey in the context of EU reforms and the growing awareness (both in Turkey and the world) that the PKK is a truly terrorist organization. The PKK seemed to be trying to regain the upper hand by triggering a region wide Turkish-Kurdish conflict. Ankara, however, did not fall into the trap, avoided taking hasty domestic measures and with patient diplomatic effort was able to convince all concerned, including the US, of its legitimate right to strike back at the PKK.
In an optimistic scenario, a brief ground operation would eliminate the logistic infrastructure of the PKK in northern Iraq. When this mission is accomplished an amnesty for rank-and-file PKK militants and new reforms to broaden Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights in Turkey would follow. Enhanced cooperation between Ankara, Washington, Baghdad and Arbil would finally put an end to the PKK activity in Iraq.
In a pessimistic scenario, on the other hand, the operation gets out of control and leads to clashes between the Turkish troops and the peshmerga, the Iraqi Kurdish forces, as hoped for by nationalist circles in Turkey who regard the Kurdish regional government as sponsors of the PKK. Conflict with the Kurds of Iraq would further alienate Turkey's Kurds from Ankara and thus finally lead to Turkey falling into the PKK trap.
The latter scenario seems unlikely, while the former too good to be true.
