Law No. 5816, enacted in 1951 soon after transition to multi-party politics in Turkey, stipulates that any one who "publicly insults or denigrates Atatürk's memory will be punished by one to three years in prison," and that "the punishment will be increased by half if the crime is committed in spaces open to the public or in publication." Yayla's defense lawyers have stated that Yayla's words constitute neither an insult to nor a denigration of Atatürk and that they will appeal the sentence. Although not very likely, it is possible that the Court of Cassation will decide to cancel the sentence. If not the case will surely end up at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg because Turkey was one of the first signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights.Consequently the more significant questions posed by the conviction of Yayla are the following: How is it possible that Yayla's words are judged as an insult or denigration of Atatürk? How is it possible that some media outlets declare Yayla a "traitor" and make him the target of a hate campaign because he also stated in the same conference that "Kemalism corresponds more to regression than progress"? How can it be that in Turkey, which is a "Second Wave democracy" that adopted multi-party politics in the late 1940s, it is still not possible to freely debate Atatürk and the policies he pursued without risking imprisonment and being declared a traitor? How is it possible that the memory of Atatürk, who set the ideal of "catching up with contemporary civilization" for Turkey, is still being used for purposes that are not at all civilized?
I will try to respond to these questions: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) was a political and military genius who united the Muslims of Rumelia and Anatolia against foreign aggression, led the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in place of the Ottoman Empire that collapsed at the end of the World War I and continued the secularizing and Westernizing reforms started in early 19th century. He was a pragmatic and not an ideological leader, who in order to modernize Turkey pursued policies that varied according to changing conditions.
A recently published book titled "But which Atatürk?" written by Taha Akyol, a prominent Turkish journalist, provides an excellent account of the pragmatic nature of Atatürk's leadership by showing that it is possible to speak of "four different" Atatürks. Marginal groups in Turkey today either make a demigod of or demonize Atatürk, but there is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of people treat his memory with great respect and affection 70 years after his death.
A trend widespread especially among civilian and military bureaucracy has, however, gradually made Atatürk the subject of a personality cult that dubs him (in a manner similar to Hitler, Stalin, Mao or Kim Il Sung) "The Supreme" or "Great Leader." The same trend has also produced an ideology of Kemalism, which is officially called the "Atatürkist system of thought" and is based on a dogmatic adherence to policies pursued in the authoritarian single party period of the republic. The Atatürkist system of thought essentially means adherence to the identity policies of the period based on assimilation (Turkification) and state control of religion, including restrictions on religious freedom. This "system," which is clearly incompatible with liberal democracy, has found its most developed expression in the Constitution and laws adopted by the military regime which held power between 1980 and 1983.
The constitutional debate in Turkey today is not at all about transition from a secular to an Islamist regime as argued by some; rather it is about transition to a regime based not on the Atatürkist system of thought but on liberal democratic norms and principles.
