The US administrations valued Turkey’s role in the defense of the West, developed a special relationship with the Turkish military and supported its guardianship role over the semi-democratic regime. The end of the Cold War was regarded by many as signaling the end of Turkey’s strategic value for the US. The first Gulf War, however, proved otherwise. Turkey became a cornerstone of the US policy to contain Saddam Hussein between 1990 and 2003. Ankara allowed the US to use the İncirlik base to conduct Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), which created a safe haven for the Kurds of Iraq from Saddam. Turkish-Kurdish separatist terror organization the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), however, started using northern Iraq as a base for its attacks against Turkey. Disagreements over the OPC led to increasing mutual mistrust between Ankara and Washington. But President Bill Clinton’s support for Turkey’s EU candidacy and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and US assistance in the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 significantly improved Turkey-US relations, which were dubbed a “strategic partnership.” Ankara wholeheartedly supported US efforts to achieve stability in the former Yugoslavia and unequivocally took sides with the US in the war against the Taliban following the Sept. 11 terror attacks on the US.
However, the unilateralist and militarist foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration and its decision to invade Iraq despite Ankara’s opposition led to unprecedented tensions in the Turkey-US relationship. Fearing the country’s disintegration, the Turkish government tried to persuade the Bush administration to refrain from invading Iraq. Washington responded by putting increasing pressure on Ankara to allow US troops to be based in Turkish territory in order to stage a ground offensive against Saddam. Divisions among the civilian and military leadership in Turkey and strong public opposition against the war finally led the Turkish Parliament to narrowly reject a bill allowing Ankara’s cooperation in the invasion. As a result Turkey lost leverage in Iraq but stayed out of what was to turn into the Iraqi quagmire, avoided the risk of a Turkish-Kurdish war, proved wrong allegations that it was an “American lackey,” substantially improved its image in world public opinion and most importantly was able to implement the economic and political reforms essential for its EU bid.
Until they departed the US administration, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz continued to blame Turkey for US failures in Iraq, but Washington increasingly came to realize that Turkish noninvolvement in the invasion actually allowed at least the Kurdish part of Iraq to remain stable. In addition, Ankara’s logistical support for the US war efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq allowed for the gradual improvement of the bilateral relationship, although the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis due to the invasion destroyed the public image of the US in Turkey. Nowhere else in the world is the Bush administration as unpopular as it is in Turkey. The growing divergence between the foreign policies of Ankara and Washington after the invasion of Iraq is perhaps best portrayed in Graham E. Fuller’s remarkable article titled “Our Fraying Alliance with Turkey” (LA Times, Oct. 19, 2007). He notes that northern Iraq is certainly the most difficult issue between Turkey and the US. An important part of the Turkish political establishment is concerned that with US assistance the Iraqi Kurds will move toward greater autonomy and eventual independence, fearing this would fan separatist tendencies among Turkey’s own Kurds. The failures of the US and the Iraqi Kurds to take effective measures against the PKK activity in northern Iraq are even more upsetting for Ankara and the Turkish public.
The declaration of the PKK as a “common enemy” by President Bush during Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Washington on Nov. 5 and the ensuing provision by the US of “actionable intelligence” on the PKK seem to signal the opening of a new chapter in Turkey-US relations. It may also signal the end of Washington’s so far lacking determination to try to reconcile the interests of two of its important allies in the Middle East, the Turks and the Kurds.
