He kindly briefed Minister Mehmet Şimşek about US administration efforts against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). I don't know if Şimşek was content with this briefing, but I do remember Urbancic telling a group of Turkish journalists a long time ago about what they had done on the matter. The problem back then and still now is that US actions cover everywhere but northern Iraq. Clearly, we the journalists haven't been contented, the Turkish government hasn't been contented and the Turkish public definitely hasn't been contented. However, the question is, does it really matter? Do Americans really care whether Turks are happy or not? "Not so much," the US government's track record full of unfulfilled promises suggests.Many people in Turkey think the US has only been trying to buy time at the expense of Turkish losses to terror and to the benefit of Kurdish interests. Since there has not been much in the way of visible concrete developments, how could one blame them? US-borrowed Turkish time stops short of buying Iraqi and Kurdish leaders' consent for action. They simply don't think Turkey would invade northern Iraq under the current diplomatic and military conditions. And they probably think they can manage anything short of that with the help of their big brother the US.
The US has been a big brother to Turkey as well since we entered NATO. Our big brother protected us from communism during the Cold War, and we helped him in return at many of his world-policing jobs. After the demise of the Soviet Union, Turks started thinking that they didn't need that much protection from big brother. It gradually became evident that Turkey's support for every US policy could not be taken for granted anymore. Hence, in Bush the II's Iraq war, limited support was offered to the Americans. Although it was quite a considerable contribution to a controversial war effort, Americans were extremely disappointed because US expectations were so high. Then came the time for Turkey to be disappointed: The US left its brother alone with the terrorist threat emanating from the country which it has invaded and overseen. And I would be very surprised if the cycle of disappointment on both US and Turkish sides ends anytime soon.
If there had been a serious dialogue between both countries on Iraq's future, we could have dealt with the problem of the PKK in northern Iraq more effectively. But as Ian Lesser in his recent report titled "Rethinking US-Turkish Relations: Beyond Suspicion" correctly points out, the US does not seriously consult with Turkey, the closest NATO ally to the Middle East region, on issues pertaining to Iraq. One explanation might be the disappointment factor, and there are structural elements as well. The radars of two critical US institutions -- the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Pentagon's Central Command (CENTCOM) -- which are chiefly responsible for Iraqi affairs, are almost blind to Turkey. On the other hand, the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the State Department and EUCOM (US European Command) of the Pentagon, which cover Turkey, are well informed on the country and can act in a more responsive way to Turkish concerns. However, it has been hard for any knowledgeable US official to move their relevant colleagues to action. It is regrettable that institutionalized habits and egos in the US government may result in further alienating a former strategic partner, not to mention incompetence, of course.
From the ivory towers of Washington, Turkey may look like a mid-scale country which cannot stand in the way of the US, but that doesn't help with securing the waning "coalition of the willing." Instead, it further pushes disappointed nations like Turkey into the club of unwilling US allies. Due to lack of attention, wisdom and respect, the US cannot benefit from Turkey as a strategic asset as much as it could and pays the cost in lost opportunities. But if Turkey chooses to be a liability, especially in the Middle East, the actual costs to US interests (as well as Turkey) would definitely hurt. I don't expect such a thing will happen soon in a dramatic way; but if the cycle of mutual disappointments persist, that is eventually inevitable.
The road to the hearts and minds of Turks goes through northern Iraq, not one-sided congressional resolutions insulting them with genocide claims. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates nowadays frequently talks about the need for "actionable intelligence" to do just that. Mr. Gates wants us to believe the main reason for inaction against the PKK is lack of intelligence. Isn't he sort of right? Had American, Iraqi and Kurdish leaderships been intelligent enough, they would not have risked alienating a critical nation like Turkey. However I'm afraid the state of "in-actionable unintelligence" might persist for some time to come.
