Difficult as it may be to give an immediate “yes” to this question, it cannot be completely out of the question. The main reason for the passage of the motion is to be able to carry out a cross-border operation when necessary to stop the terrorism that comes from northern Iraq and to thoroughly root it out. This being true to a great extent, two things should not be disregarded: the first is the phenomenon we call the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is no longer an issue to be handled alone. What comes to mind along with the PKK is the Kurdish regional authority in northern Iraq, the United States and even Israel. In short, taking up any stance against the PKK is simultaneously directly related to regional and global actors.The second is, as we can understand from the position the PKK is given in the motion and from the “contiguous areas” noted therein, “northern Iraq” is still a part of Iraq, which hasn’t yet been divided into three parts thoroughly and radically. What makes President Jalal Talabani and Prime Minister Maliki ill at ease is that a possible 25th cross-border operation to be carried out by Turkey could involve the whole of Iraq.
This shows us the strength of the possibility of Turkey coming face-to-face with Iraq in its entirety in the event it exercises the authority granted to it by Parliament. Such a possibility is of concern to the Iraqi administration, the United States and Israel as well as two of our important neighbors Syria and Iran. Turkey has to maintain its regional perspective under any circumstances: if it “buries its head” in northern Iraq, it makes a very grave mistake. The day the motion passed, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was in Turkey and stated that he strongly supported Turkey’s right to carry out a cross-border operation. Also, looking at the Iranian press in recent months, we see an increase in publications that bolster the AK Party government -- and this shows that Iran is adopting a position close to Turkey.
The government’s having the final say on issues like “scope, limits, magnitude and duration” as underlined in the motion points to the political effect and function of the motion, in addition to its military side. In a democratic country, the civil political authority is thus underlining its authorities. The government will naturally wish to exercise its authorities as granted by the motion firstly in political and diplomatic fields. We will together try to observe in the coming days to what extent the government’s plans will turn out to be well-adjusted ones. However, it is possible to say this much at the moment: the passage of the motion is a sign of determination and it will have a considerable impact in the sight of the United States and EU-member states.
As the atmosphere in the region gets more and more heated, can radical changes occur in the stance of countries with regard to the incursion? This question, too, is a difficult one to which we cannot simply say yes. But “the stones laid” in the first quarter of the last century have been irrevocably moved. The developments that take place cause cold winds to blow between Turkey and its allies of 50 years. The clearest fact is that the real threats against Turkey come not from its neighbors, but from its “allies” and each new development brings Turkey face to face with its Western allies. Looking from this angle, the government was able to easily implement its policy of “zero disagreement with neighbors” as there is in fact no real discrepancy between Turkey and the countries in the region. This odd paradox is an open indicator of what sort of things are unforeseeable in the region: Up until 1999, the PKK was based in Syria, but now the Syrian president supports a possible operation Turkey will carry out against the PKK with all his heart. And the United States, which “packed” the leader of the PKK in Kenya and delivered him to Turkey, is taking its place on the stage as the force behind the PKK.
