Every contact we meet cautiously whispers that this time the infamous Armenian resolution might pass. Interestingly, they also acknowledge that they know that it is not in the interest of the US to do so. Regardless of the gloom and doom, some analysts believe that there is still some common sense among the democrats that recognizes the potential risks of passing such a resolution at this time. "Why kill the cash cow now when we are entering an election campaign?" noted another. Of course it is clear that once the resolution passes there would be no more need to financially support exorbitant election campaigns. The present situation is actually ideal as it allows representatives to garner the benefits of the current environment, which on the one hand suggests inevitability and on the other leans on the sober reality of impossibility. Let the Armenians pay for one more year. Needless to say, the security threat posed by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the unwillingness of the US to assert proper influence over President Massoud Barzani was at the center of our meetings. We humble Turks have difficulty grasping how the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) can manage to get away with stalling action on the PKK when President Bush and Secretary of State Rice repeatedly ordered the military command to deal with the PKK issue. Turkey's friends in Washington were equally aghast when Undersecretary Burns listed the areas in which the US was expecting Turkey's help at an Atlantic Council event. Unfortunately, no one among the audience could hear what Washington was offering in exchange. Turkish ears were particularly curious to hear what was going to be said about the PKK menace in northern Iraq. Far from expecting any new items on the agenda, Ankara would have been happy to hear what its NATO ally was going to do about the PKK, which really is a responsibility rather than a favor. In fact, the overall message of Burns' speech was that all was fine on the Turkish-American front. Luckily Burns avoided reading his wish list to Prime Minister Erdoğan in Ankara.
We Turks need to come to terms with the fact that this administration is not going to lift a finger on the PKK. The only hope is that the violence remains at a sustainable level until a new administration takes its place in the White House. Fixing the Turkish-American relationship will take years, if it happens at all. The US appears to have made a very calculated choice when it comes to Turks and Kurds in Iraq. That choice is clearly in favor of Mr. Barzani and the Kurds. That a strategic ally is alienated and is being lost in the process appears to be a secondary concern. It is too early to tell what this will mean in the mid to long term, but this relationship is neither strategic nor visionary any more. We need to get used to it and reorganize ourselves, instead of reminiscing about the old days or deceiving ourselves about a nonexistent partnership.
A last word is appropriate on the Iraqi Kurds. Iraqi Kurds, especially those who burn with Barzani's nationalism, seem to believe in the illusion that the US will provide them with an eternal security umbrella. Similar to the Romanians, they are inexperienced in dealing with our friends in Washington. Regardless of what they base their calculations on, there is no doubt that Turks, Kurds, Iranians and Syrians, not to mention the Shiites and Sunnis of Iraq, will be facing each other when everyone else is gone. Wise leadership would take this into account.
Ultimately an honest discussion on how to mend the Turkish-American relationship would require the US to make significant policy changes. This is not going to happen before 2009, if at all. We should acknowledge that instead of pretending that all is fine.
