Could the Ulus bombing push the gov’t into cross-border operation?

A special coordination mechanism was established almost nine months ago by a US initiative to pre-empt a possible Turkish unilateral cross-border operation. But Turkish Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt also declared during an April 12 press conference the military's readiness in staging an operation to pursue the PKK terrorists based in the region if the government gives permission to do so.

The Ulus bombing incident, suspected to have been staged by the outlawed PKK with A-4 explosives, reminded me of what a senior Turkish general told me more than a year ago, when speaking about under what conditions the military could be triggered to stage a cross-border operation into northern Iraq regardless of a cooperation with the US forces in the region.

This general told me that a major PKK terrorist attack within Turkey, killing many and injuring dozens, could prompt the military to enter into northern Iraq.

As the PKK has increased its terrorist activities, mainly in the Southeast as the weather in the region has become milder, there have been increased voices coming largely from the military over the possibility of a cross-border operation.

But now the bombing incident in Ulus has allegedly proven that the PKK is spreading its violence in Turkey's big cities, marking a spectacular attack, and raising fears that it could trigger the government to allow the military to enter into northern Iraq.

It remains to be seen whether any such Turkish military offensive will take place. It also remains to be seen whether the US will agree to coordinate any such Turkish military offensive into northern Iraq.

Unlike initial speculations, the US State Department in particular early this year ruled out suggestions of a Turkish cross-border operation in coordination with US forces. The US fears a Turkish military offensive, even in coordination with its forces, could cause collateral damage in the quietest part of Iraq, despite the latest bombing incidents in the region.

In the meantime the special coordination mechanism, protested by many in Turkey as an attempt to internationalize the PKK problem, has thus far not yielded any result that the Turkish decision makers hoped to see, such as the US dropping bombs on PKK camps in the region or a cross-border operation.

The main reason behind what has been seen as a failure of the mechanism is the differing goals of the parties represented, as Turkey still sees military option not as a last resort but as a priority tool to hit PKK logistics in northern Iraq.

But Turkish and US announcements, coming after the removal of Gen. Başer from his post, that the mechanism would continue also underline the resolve of the Turkish and US political leaders to give a further chance to the diplomatic process rather than to a military offensive into northern Iraq.

It is also worth mentioning that although the mechanism aimed to bring together all the parties involved, i.e., the Iraqis and the Iraqi Kurdish leaders controlling the PKK-dominated northern Iraq, this did not happen. Mainly due to the Turkish military's objection to speaking with the Iraqi Kurds, which it accused of assisting the PKK, as well as the Iraqi central authority's inability to control the whole country.

It was only in 2005, before the special coordination mechanism was set up, that Turks and Iraqis got together in Washington to talk about how to eliminate the PKK existence in northern Iraq and thus reduce terrorist infiltrations into Turkey.

Nevertheless despite the awareness -- even among those who desire a cross-border operation to pursue the PKK terrorists -- that this will have only a short-lived effect and will not solve the Kurdish problem inside Turkey, the desire behind such an operation may be to win popular support among Turks, the majority of whom wrongly believe that the main cause of the problem stems from northern Iraq.