Rather, the transformation of Islamic actors in Turkey owes a great deal to the economic and social opening up to the world during the 1980s and 1990s, which freed them from their political patronage. As a result, we witnessed the emergence of an Islamic middle class, with entrepreneurs and intellectuals who demanded their share of power and benefits from the system. Added to this is the 1999 invitation of the EU to Turkey as a candidate country, which has brought about greater liberties that the Islamic groups are enjoying as well.Yet there is no doubt that the February 28 process has had a perceptible impact on Islamic thinking and strategy. In the face of pressures originating from the military, which influenced attitudes of the judges and high state bureaucracy as well as mainstream secular media, the Islamic circles realized the virtues and legitimizing power of democracy.
After 1997, the political representatives of Islamic movements understood that despite their popular support, they were and always would be seen as an “illegitimate” political force, an anomaly in Turkish politics, by Kemalist or “secularist” circles. Moreover, democracy was a source of strength because it was through democratic means that they could demonstrate their popular legitimacy. In the face of pressures coming from the military, the judiciary and other Kemalist circles, democracy emerged as a means to highlight “people power” vis-à-vis the state power. As they felt the pressures of the “state power” (the military and judiciary) opposing them, they turned to the “people power” they knew they enjoyed. Thus Islamic circles adopted the discourse of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as a means for protection against the excessive power of the state. They came to see democracy as a matter of survival.
Islamic groups went through similar experiences concerning the value of modern concepts of human rights and the rule of law as they saw their political parties closed down, leaders banned from political activities, and their associations and foundations intimidated. In response, they moved to embrace the language of civil and political rights that provided them with both an effective leverage against the pressures of the state and a ground to build international coalitions. And they forged a unique coalition with pro-reform groups at home and abroad, that bolstered the position of the Islamic polity vis-à-vis their Kemalist/secularist opponents.
Thus the main body of the Islamic movement has adapted a new and positive stance on approaching the West, Turkey’s membership in the EU and the integration of Turkey into global structures and process. This was a clear break from its tradition that was used to be based on outright rejection of the West, a deep suspicion of the modern political discourse (including that of democracy and human rights) and an objection to Turkish experience of westernization.
In short, the Islamic polity has in recent years managed to distance themselves from their earlier responsive attitude, which presented a denial of the notions of democracy and human rights as Western constructions irrelevant for Muslims. The changing discourse and positions of Islamic groups represent an important move, not only for the spread of modern political values among the Islamic groups in Turkey but also for a possibility of rapprochement between Islam and the West. A departure from rejecting the West and modern political values seems to have transformed the Islamic self in Turkey as well, with a tremendous impact on the relationship between Islam and the west.
It was this transformation that paved the way for an electoral victory in 2002 for the transformed AK Party that has been ruling the country since then, and the opportunity for the AK Party leader, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to be elected as president. What is the question now is whether the Islamic periphery will remain on this track, or whether it will retreat to its traditional anti-West and anti-reform stands. The answer to this is extremely important since it will deeply affect the balance of power between democratic pro-reform groups and authoritarian xenophobic forces.
