We’ve already mentioned the differing priorities of Turkey and the US concerning Iraq. Small steps can lead to the unification of priorities and to an agreement on policies and application methods in the near future. But some fundamental difficulties remain. First of all, Gül’s visit clearly showed that the US has no time to wait for Turkish priorities to coincide with American ones because it is in a difficult position in several regions of the globe and particularly in Iraq. The US administration is also bogged down in domestic policy issues, including not only Democrats but some Republicans as well. Hence, the US cannot wait for the adaptation of Turkey’s priorities and is seeking to force its hand in some regards. The talks between the two officials headlined the issues of Lebanon, Iraq, northern Iraq, Kirkuk, the PKK, Kosovo, the Exclusive Economic Zone issue in Cyprus and the resolution on the recognition of the Armenian “genocide.” This is not simply a list of Turkey’s problems with states or peoples in the surrounding regions. They also determine the relations of Turkey with the two “Wests,” namely the US and the EU, and the Middle East. In short, these are fundamental issues about Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy. It’s not reasonable in terms of theory or practice to suggest that they will be resolved consecutively. That’s why one shouldn’t analyze them separately in a supposed linage. The main reason for the establishment of such a list is to take hostage all other issues in order to obtain the resolution of a privileged one.
The US has admitted it cannot convince Turkey to share the US’ priorities concerning Iraq in a short period of time, that’s why it’s trying to apply pressure via Turkish priorities. The resolution on the Armenian “genocide” was not a completely calculated maneuver, but the Bush administration is doing its best to profit from it. The majority of Congressmen favor this bill and the Bush administration are promising Turkey it will do everything to block it. In other words, the Democrats who proposed the resolution are not holding the sword of Damocles in their hands, but the Bush administration is. Under these circumstances, connections are established between the PKK and the Armenian issue, Cyprus and Lebanon, Kosovo and military bases.
This process is not only making Turkey choose between its problems. If Turkey accepts an engagement in the whole of Iraq and not only in its northern provinces in order to obstruct the Armenian genocide resolution, this would mean a significant change in orientation in Turkey’s future. It may also lead to the establishment of a Lebanon-Cyprus crisis line to assure the resolution of several issues concerning the Middle East between the EU and the US, in favor of the latter. Such a crisis line could also be used later against Turkey as a bargaining chip at the center of Turkey-EU relations. That’s why talks held by Gül and Rice should help organize bilateral relations without forcing Turkey to change its track.
